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Introduction
Inequities in the provision of basic health care services and the
continued resilience of the health care industry to cost restraints have
led to the first omnibus presidential proposal for national health care
reform.1 Health care policy is currently fashioned via a multitude of
interdependent and overlapping regulatory programs enacted by the
Federal and State governments,2 with implementation left in the
hands of a highly decentralized set of actors, including physicians, hos-
pitals, and local mental health agencies. Elements comprising the
1. The Bush Administration proposed a much less ambitious health reform plan in
1990, see, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S. 8659-65 (1990) (discussing President Bush's proposals),
but it received far less attention than has the Clinton plan. Prior to the most recent legisla-
tive efforts, discussed in Part I, national regulatory programs have focused on particular
subsets of the American citizenry, such as the elderly via Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395ccc (1998, Supp. 1990). The Clinton Administration released a lengthy "description"
of its Federal health care reform plan, titled the Health Security Act of 1993, on September
7, 1993. See Clinton Administration's Description of President's Health Reform Plan
(BNA-Westlaw ver. Sept. 14,1993), part 2 [hereinafter Clinton Description]. News reports
suggest that the original plan was produced primarily by health care policymakers and
experts, and that the advice of Justice Department attorneys on legal issues such as the
plan's constitutionality was not sought until after the description's publication. See Robert
Pear, Clinton's Health Plan; Officials Predict Deluge of Suits on Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1993, at Al.
2. Prominent Federal health care regulatory efforts include the Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-238 (1988 Supp. 1990), Medicare, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ecc (1988
Supp. 1990), and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 Supp. 1990). See, e.g., Maxwell
J. Mehlman & Karen A. Visocan, Medicare and Medicaid: Are They Just Health Care Sys-
tems? 29 Hous. L. REv. 835 (1992). In addition to their administrative involvement in
both of these Federal programs, States have enacted a wide range of regulatory programs,
including attempts to control hospital costs, provide subsidized health insurance for the
working poor, and proscribe balance billing. See generally GENERAL AccoUM~nNo OF-
FicE, AccEss TO HEALTH CARE: STATES RESPOND TO THE GROWING CRISIS (1992) (iden-
tifying and evaluating States' initiatives); Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism:
Legal Impediments to State Health Care Reform, 19 Am. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993); see also
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1990).
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health care system might have been permitted to meander along their
self-determined paths indefinitely, impervious to national policymak-
ers' effective reach, but for the confluence of a persistent economic
recession and steadily rising health care, costs.' Reacting to the per-
ceived inability of the present system to guarantee to each citizen ade-
quate health care at a reasonable cost, President Clinton has proposed
to unite virtually all entities and programs that deliver health care
under one comprehensive Federal administrative structure. Other
political leaders have also advanced their own initiatives, leading to a
veritable "orgy" of bill-writing.4
The President's plan, however, does not propose to federalize the
entirety of health care policy creation, implementation, and service
delivery. The substantive approach publicly typed "managed compe-
tition"5 would be effectuated via an administrative structure the Presi-
dent advances as an instance of cooperative federalism.6 The
3. See Clinton Description, supra note 1, at 2 (detailing rate of increase of health care
costs and their continuous growth as a proportion of GNP).
4. Cf. GuDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982)
(describing an "orgy of statute-making" that fundamentally changed American law").
5. Professor Alain Enthoven pioneered this market reform theory. Theories from his
book, ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE
SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE (1980), were purportedly applied in a variety of ways
within the various health reform bills. Enthoven has rejected many of these applications,
including most prominently the Clinton bill. See Robert Pear, Warning on Clinton Health
Proposal From Idea's Originator, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994, at B8.
6. The President's Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(h) (1993),
recommends a congressional finding that health care reform should proceed from a "part-
nership" between the Federal and State governments. The Supreme Court has denomi-
nated examples of "cooperative federalism" those regulatory programs in which the
Federal and State governments combine their efforts (both financial and administrative) to
govern an activity. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2424 (1992) (eval-
uating the constitutionality of various penalties against States for noncompliance with the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Acts); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (strik-
ing down Alabama's ban on Aid to Families with Dependent Children where an able-
bodied man cohabited with the family). Some joint Federal-State regulatory efforts are
initiated by the Federal government under its spending power and take the form of grant
programs. Other proceed under the commerce power and incorporate the penalty of pre-
empting any nonparticipating State from the particular regulatory field. This latter type,
known as conditional preemption programs, sometimes also include Federal grant monies
to facilitate States' compliance. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and
the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Con-
ditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 289 (1984); Lewis Kaden, Politics, Money & State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979). Some State officials have labeled some joint regulatory pro-
grams more akin to "coercive federalism" than cooperative federalism. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986) (ruling that the
Constitution did not bar Congress from preventing States and public agencies from with-
drawing from Federal old age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits programs if they
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President's plan charges States to undertake significant regulatory and
financial responsibilities, and promises some funds to assist in the ef-
fort. Its contours, its proponents assert, follow those of other estab-
lished regulatory and benefit programs such as Medicaid and Aid to
Families with Dependent Children;7 it is merely new wine in old ves-
sels. Hence, its advocates submit, the plan's constitutional validity
cannot seriously be questioned.
But the constitutional questions about a Federal intrusion on
State power are not so easily dismissed.8 In light of New York v.
United States,9 national regulatory programs are subject to new scru-
tiny under the Tenth Amendment ° if they command States to imple-
ment Federal policy and impose significant duties and costs on State
governments. The Supreme Court has also cautioned that a program
promulgated pursuant to Congress' spending power," though subject
to a deferential standard of review, will offend the Constitution when
its incentives to adopt national policy become so "coercive" of State
participation that it "pass[es] the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion.""' 2 The President's health reform program, as well as the
many competing alternatives, contains numerous measures overtly
were participating on the effective date of the statutory amendment); see also THE AcAD-
EMY FOR STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PREEMPTION: DRAWING THE LINE (1986); ADvI-
SORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL STATUTORY PREEMPTION
OF STATE & LOCAL AUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVENTORY, & IssUEs (1992).
7. Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-662 (1988, Supp. 1990). The Federal and State governments
have shared responsibility for determining the eligibility criteria, benefits levels, and fund-
ing of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. See Frank S. Bloch,
Cooperative Federalism and the Role of Litigation in the Development of Federal AFDC
Eligibility Policy, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 1.
8. This Article is limited to evaluating a segment of the constitutional implications of
the pending health proposals, and thus does not survey the entire range of constitutional
issues present in the current debate. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Constitutional Limits on
Physician Price Controls, 21 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 635 (1994); William S. Brewbaker HI,
Health Care Price Controls and the Takings Clause, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 669 (1994).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (ruling, inter alia, that the Tenth Amendment prohibited
Congress from forcing States to take title to nuclear waste produced within their borders as
a penalty for noncompliance with the Federal effort to establish low-level radioactive waste
facilities).
10. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
11. Article I expressly confers the power to "lay and collect Taxes .... to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
12. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
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designed to coerce State financial and administrative participation
that raise serious constitutional questions.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. The first briefly summarizes
the approach of each of the pending health reform bills and distills
those portions relevant to current Tenth Amendment and Spending
Clause analysis. Provisions that would impose on States the financial
and administrative responsibility for achieving Federal regulatory
objectives or that specify punitive measures to be taken against States
choosing not to participate in the cooperative program are critical fea-
tures for the inquiry. Employing these criteria, the first Part identifies
seven distinct and largely novel models of problematic regulatory in-
structions that warrant more probative analysis.
The second Part briefly outlines the Court's erratic path to New
York and evaluates its approach for assessing whether Federal law un-
constitutionally usurps State power in the service of national regula-
tory goals. National health reform raises again the substantive policy
issue that has generated grave concern from constitutional scholars,
who have divided into separate camps over the justiciability of the
Tenth Amendment.' 3 In its latest decision, the Court has taken the
route the dissenters in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority'4 predicted and found the Amendment justiciable in some re-
13. Compare JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL
PROCESS (1980) [hereinafter CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEw]; Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of
National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE LJ.
1552 (1977) (arguing that the policy-oriented aspects of legislative decisions on federalism
issues render them inappropriate for judicial review and thus properly committed to the
political branches) [hereinafter Choper, Scope of National Power]; and Martha A. Field,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doc-
trine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985) (arguing that the Court has many ways to protect State
interests without invoking the Constitution) with William W. Van Alstyne, The Second
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1985) (arguing that the Court has erred
gravely in relegating protection of federalism to the political processes of Congress) and
William W. Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the State and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift
in the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769 (1987).
In part traceable to the opportunistic manner the Reagan Administration employed in
its call for a "New Federalism," some commentators continue to be skeptical about the
actual goals of federalism's proponents. They perceive political or substantive hostility to
Federal goals to be the real motivation, masked in structural constitutional garb. See gen-
erally S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 685, 701 n.70 (1991) (discussing the Nixon and Reagan Administrations' records on
federalism). Their fears are buttressed by opposition to Federal civil rights enforcement in
the 1950s and 60s, which was veiled in similar rhetoric. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Littlest
Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick and the Second Civil War, 10 CONST. COMM. 19 (1993).
14. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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spects,' 5 an outcome endorsed here. Although taking care not to
overrule Garcia,'6 the New York opinion identified one boundary be-
yond which the Congress may not tread though exercising otherwise
legitimate commerce power.17 Moreover, the New York Court implic-
itly rejected the proposition that if Congress can legitimately preempt
States from the regulatory field, any means it chooses to induce States
to participate in the Federal-State cooperative venture is permissi-
ble.' 8 Thus, the greater power does not ipso facto incorporate the
lesser. Finally, this Part hazards some thoughts in response to Profes-
sor Erwin Chemerinsky's view that the new federalism jurisprudence
does not serve any of the traditional values of federalism, offering a
justification for New York's conclusion while criticizing its reasoning.
Part III turns to evaluate the seven problematic models of Fed-
eral regulatory instructions in light of New York and related prece-
dent. This Article argues that some of these models fail under the
Court's current approach to the Tenth Amendment and others are
open to serious question. Some modifications to pending bills may be
warranted to ensure their constitutionality under the Tenth Amend-
ment. Those models implicating primarily the spending power, rather
than the Tenth Amendment, are substantially better insulated from
constitutional attack. Some uses of this power, however, raise ques-
tions about the continuing adequacy of the Court's deferential stan-
dard of review given their impact on republican citizenship and
representative government.
The close analysis of the pending bills' problematic provisions
leads to some reflections, with which the Article concludes. First,
whatever criticisms may be leveled at the New York opinion, by it the
Court has achieved what was so elusive in New York's predecessors,
the National League of Cities'9 line of cases: legal standards that are
both judicially discoverable and reasonably manageable. This
achievement undermines some of the claims of those who maintain
that the Tenth Amendment should be nonjusticiable. In addition,
some tacitly worry that rendering the Tenth Amendment justiciable
15. See id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580-82 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
16. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992).
17. The Court held that Congress may not ."commandeer[] the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a Federal regulatory pro-
gram."' Id. at 2420 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
18. See id. at 2424.
19. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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will obstruct Congress in implementing national programs. New York,
however, removes only a small range of the potential tools that the
nation might employ to achieve its ends. A multitude of methods re-
main available to the Federal government, either by direct regulation
or by indirect coaxing, to generate State participation in intergovern-
mental regulatory partnerships. While New York produces an ironic
doctrine for federalism values,20 it provides an important basis for re-
furbishing the federal structure of our Republic.
I. The Reform Proposals and Their Problematic Commands
to State Governments
While campaigning for the Presidency, then-Governor Clinton
promised to introduce health reform legislation within his first 100
days in office. That timetable proved too ambitious. But he did estab-
lish a White House task force on health reform, entrusting its leader-
ship to the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton. The principles of
health reform subsequently established by the White House have gen-
erally set the terms for the political debate. The President's six foun-
dational principles-security ("guaranteeing comprehensive benefits
to all Americans"), simplicity ("simplifying the system and cutting red
tape"), savings ("controlling health costs"), quality ("making the
world's best care better"), choice ("preserving and increasing the op-
tions you have today"), and responsibility ("making everyone respon-
sible for health care") 21-surface repeatedly in the promotional
20. The doctrine is ironic because, although the Federal government cannot command
the States to implement a Federal program, it can preempt a field falling within the com-
merce power, and thereby oust the States from jurisdiction over the area. So long as the
Federal regulatory statute has general applicability to both the private sector and the
states, it will not violate the Tenth Amendment. Thus, the more a Federal legislative provi-
sion treats States as though they were just private entities, the more likely the Court will
approve its constitutionality. This is a curious rule for protecting the distinctive constitu-
tional role of the States. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
21. THE WIrrE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURITY: THE PREsI-
DENT'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 17-20 (1993) [hereinafter HEALTH SECURITY];
see also Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993) (listing six "pur-
poses"). Earlier, in a narrative description of its incipient health reform bill, the Adminis-
tration included a statement of the "ethical foundations of health reform," which stated:
"The values and principles that shape the new health care system reflect fundamental na-
tional beliefs about community, equality, justice, and liberty. These convictions anchor
health reform in shared moral traditions." See Clinton Description, supra note 1, at Part 2.
This narrative description amplified the foundational principles at issue: universal access to
health care; comprehensive benefits for all; choice of provider and treatment; equality of
care for all; fair distribution of costs across the community; personal responsibility for the
protection and promotion of health and for contribution to the cost of health care; in-
tergenerational justice responsive to the unique health care needs across the life span; a
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statements written in support of competing legislative proposals.22
A. Background Policy Issues
Basic policy issues in the health care debate form the necessary
backdrop against which to examine the constitutionality of the reform
programs. Significantly, although the reform proposals generally con-
front the same set of policy questions, their answers differ widely.
1.- Public or Private Insurance
The threshold structural question faced by health reform propo-
nents is whether to maintain some system of private health insurance.
The advocates of a single-payer system23 part company with all the
rest at this juncture, and propose to abolish private health insurance
for the comprehensive "standard" coverage that would be made avail-
able to all.'A Those advocating retention of private health insurers
face a variety of subsidiary questions, including how the insurance
marketplace can be reformed to permit the participation of those who
are effectively excluded under the current system. Here, small busi-
ness entities and individuals comprise the focus. The reform plans'
prototypical response lies in some version of the insurance purchasing
cooperative.' Some proposals move further by mandating certain ad-
ditional insurance reforms, including barring "experience rating" of
insureds in favor of "community rating."26 Under these approaches,
balancing of health care costs in the context of other national priorities; effective health
care delivery and management; quality of care; protection of professional medical judg-
ment; fair procedures in the operation of the health care system; and retention of the role
of States and localities for development of systems of care to serve their communities. Id.
22. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SENATOR DON NICKLES, CONSUMER CHOICE HEALTH SECUR-
rry ACT FACT SHEET 1 (listing "security of universal health coverage," "maximum choice
of health insurance plans," and "control [of] rising health care costs"); OFFICE OF SEN.
JOHN CHAFEE, SUMMARY OF THE "HEALTH EQUITY AND ACCESS REFORM ACT OF 1993"
1 (listing "secure and equitable health insurance coverage"); id. at 4 (listing "quality assur-
ance"); OFFICE OF REP. ROBERT MICHEL, THE AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE Now ACT OF
1993 2 (listing "security" and "controlling the growth of health care costs").
23. A "single-payer" system is structured so that all bills for medical and health serv-
ices are paid by a single entity, normally a governmental agency or government contractor.
For a discussion of the primary single-payer bill pending in Congress, see infra text accom-
panying notes 143-155.
24. Presumably, private health insurance would continue to be available for supple-
mental benefits.
25. This idea was pioneered by Professor Enthoven. See Enthoven, supra note 5, at
126-30. See also Victor Cohn, New Deal on Health Care; Advice From the Jackson Hole
Gang, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1992, at 27; Roger Thompson, Health Reform Takes Shape,
NATION'S Bus., April 1993, at 44.
26. "Experience rating" permits health insurers to offer more favorable premium rates
to groups of individuals that are statistically healthier than the American population as a
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Federal law would forbid discrimination in premium cost or coverage
availability on the basis of health, status, illness, age, and the like, and
would require an insurance company to write and renew the policy of
any person or group which paid premiums in a timely fashion.
2. Universal Coverage
A substantial number of Americans are not covered by any type
of health insurance. Lack of coverage occasionally has a devastating
impact on a family's finances. Thus, many of the reform proposals
advocate universal health insurance coverage, although they advocate
widely varying timetables for achieving that goal. One strategy is to
expand eligibility for Medicaid coverage to insure those just above the
poverty line, who are often termed the "working poor." Another ap-
proach is to provide subsidies to assist those who are currently unin-
sured in paying for private insurance coverage. The single-payer bill
would dispense with both of these techniques and provide direct cov-
erage to all American citizens and legal residents.
3. Cost Containment
Because the health services industry currently consumes 17% of
the gross national product and is growing at a rate substantially higher
than the overall inflation rate,' "cost containment" has become a ma-
jor goal of all reformers. Federal law currently permits employers to
deduct from income all money spent on employees' health insurance.
Some reformers would restructure these tax incentives so that em-
ployers can deduct only the cost of a basic insurance plan offering
basic benefits, even if the employer in fact purchases or subsidizes for
employees far more expensive and generous plans. Other proposals
would seek to acheive cost containment in a different fashion. The
President's plan seeks to establish a regulatory default of a cap on
insurance premiums in case market-produced savings are insuffi-
cient.2 8 He also proposes global national budgeting for health ex-
penditures, so as to place a ceiling on the amount of GNP that can be
whole. For example, experience rating permits health insurers to offer less expensive rates
to universities for insuring their employees than to most other employers. "Community
rating" forbids experience rating and requires uniform rates to all subscribers. Under this
rating approach, healthier and younger individuals effectively subsidize the ill and elderly.
See SYLVA A. LAW, BLuE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 5, 12,20-30 (1974).
27. Clinton Description, supra note 1, at 7.
28. See HEALTH SECURITY, supra note 21, at 58. This aspect of the President's propo-
sal has been criticized as leading to new forms of rationing of health services.
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consumed by the health services industry.29 To lower the costs of mal-
practice insurance and, in turn, place a brake on the rising cost of
medical care, virtually all plans provide for some kind of malpractice
reform.
Given the rising cost of Federal entitlement programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid, one goal of all reform proposals is to stabi-
lize, if not reduce, the Federal government's financial costs for these
programs. Imposing general cost controls on hospital and medical
services is a strategy employed by some reformers. An alternative ap-
proach is to abolish Medicare and Medicaid and fold their recipients
into a reformed private health system, possibly with subsidies for the
indigent. Yet another lies in modifying the programs so as to transfer
more of the financial responsibility onto State governments.
4. Financial Responsibility
Regardless how the system is reformed, questions arise regarding
who pays for the reforms and through what means. The President's
plan seeks to expand the current voluntary system of employer-paid
insurance to a mandatory system that requires employers to pay for
up to 80% of premiums for all employees. Under the President's
plan, employers would continue to receive tax deductions for their
outlays. Other plans build upon voluntary employer-provided insur-
ance, but back up that option with an individual mandate requiring all
persons who do not receive employer-subsidized coverage to purchase
basic health insurance. Most proposals seek to realize savings from
other Federal health programs and from standardizing insurance
forms, so that the overall cost of establishing the new system is re-
duced. Proposals for new taxes surface frequently, chiefly in the form
of "sin" (excise) taxes on tobacco and alcohol. The single-payer plan
departs from the rest, however, by advocating new income and em-
ployment taxes to pay for universal coverage.
5. The Role of State Government
In fashioning a new health system, the reformers also must con-
front the question of how much regulatory discretion to experiment
and programmatic diversity to permit among State governments. The
reformers differ widely here as well. Some proposals seek to elini-
nate virtually all regulatory differences among States in order to pro-
29. See infra note 98.
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duce a unitary health care system, while others plan to accord States
significant policy discretion. °
Notably, however, no plan attempting to achieve a unitary health
care system seeks to utilize the most obvious available structure: pre-
empting State and local regulatory authority and substituting a nation-
ally funded and operated administrative agency dedicated to achieving
Congress' goals." Such an approach would be initiated by a constitu-
tionally unexceptional use of the commerce power,32 despite the wide-
ranging Federal preemption engendered. Instead, all of the proposals
seeking to create a unitary health care system attempt in some fashion
to compel State governments to shoulder both the initial administra-
tive implementation and ongoing operational responsibility for this
system.33
The asserted rationales for maintaining a significant regulatory
role for State governments in a reformed health care insurance and
service delivery system would likely vary. Yet given the radical differ-
ences manifested in the bills on other key points, it is at least curious
to find significant agreement on this matter. The similarity between
proposals here, despite their diverse origins across the ideological and
political spectrum, likely lies in a basic fact of political economy: the
Federal government is strapped for cash. In order to eliminate or se-
verely restrict the politically unpalatable alternative of raising Federal
taxes,34 each of the ambitious reform proposals either attempts to en-
30. Not known previously as an advocate of decentralized policymaking, Professor
Jerry Mashaw has recently written in the popular press to caution health reform leaders of
the detriments attending the elimination of State discretion and experimentation. See Ted
Marmor & Jerry Mashaw, Perspective on Health Care: It's Rube Goldberg, Not Roosevelt,
L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1993, at B7; Ted Marmor & Jerry Marshaw, Perspective on Health
Care: Creating a Plan for "Us-Us" Medicine, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1993, at B7.
31. This basic structural outline could embrace a wide range of reform approaches,
including the single-payer system and the managed competition proposals. Like many
other Federal entities, the agency could maintain regional and local offices across the
nation.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (The "power of Congress
over interstate commerce 'is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed by the Constitution."') (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
33. The less ambitious proposals, which only tinker with the status quo, do not depend
upon the creation of any new regulatory agency such as a National Health Board, nor upon
ongoing regulatory supervision of the system at either the State or local levels. For prime
examples, see infra text accompanying notes 43-64 (Michel bill); 39-42 (Coats-Gramm-
Lugar bill).
34. Only the single-payer plan states explicitly that its program will require raising
Federal income taxes. See infra note 149. Its proponents argue that this burden will be
offset by, inter alia, its elimination of separate health insurance premiums. The abilities of
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tice State governments to ante up funds they currently employ for
health administration or health services, or orders them to implement
the Federal system, implicitly conscripting a portion of the States' per-
sonnel and budgets.3 Some proposals do include authorization for
appropriation of Federal funds to offset some of the costs State gov-
ernments would incur in complying with the Federal enactment. 6 Yet
the appropriations would be a separate budget issue for the Congress,
and amounts appropriated might very well not be available in the
sums necessary to compensate State governments for the costs of
complying with the Federal mandate. Two bills further distinguish
themselves by including a direct assessment of "fees" from the State
governments to offset the Federal government's costs of maintaining
the Federal regulatory scheme within the State. 7
Federal intrusions into the State legislative domain and the State
fisc that the proposed health plans authorize raise the issue of the con-
stitutionality of these plans under the Tenth Amendment and the
spending power. This Article finds that the pending health reform
plans challenge the constitutional boundaries of Federal power in at
least seven distinct ways:38
1. Federal regulation of non-Federal public-sector employee ben-
efits: The Federal government establishes health program re-
quirements, and permits a State to choose whether to enact
enabling legislation and regulations in order to participate in the
program and receive certain regulatory authority under the
plan. The Federal health program, however, covers not only all
private employers within the State but also all public employers,
including State and local governments-even those of nonpar-
other plans, particularly the President's, to avoid or limit broad-based Federal tax increases
remain one significant point of debate.
35. President Clinton has issued an executive order restricting the issuance of un-
funded mandates. See Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (1993). The reform
plans predicated upon a Federal-State partnership also have the merit from the federal
standpoint of limiting the creation of a new Federal health care bureaucracy. The estab-
lishment of another unwieldy Federal bureaucracy is another fear of those resisting the
more ambitious health care plans. See infra note 68.
36. See, ag., the Clinton bill, the Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
37. The Michel bill, see infra text accompanying notes 43-64, and the Cooper bill, see
infra text accompanying notes 65-74, would tax State governments for the Federal
program.
38. This Part of the Article only discusses those models of Federal-State relations in
the health care plans that may transgress the Tenth Amendment or the spending power.
Many of the proposed reform plans provide for grants to States to entice them into per-
forming certain activities. As a general matter, this Part does not highlight these more
routine uses of the Federal power to offer conditional grants, but marks for inquiry only
the instances testing the outer limits of this power.
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ticipating, unconsenting States-and imposes significant addi-
tional costs on them.
2. Untethered regulatory command: The Federal government
commands States to institute a particular regulatory program.
The Federal government, however, has no default system by
which to institute the program within the State if the State fails
to comply. The Federal government's command to States to
regulate is unaccompanied by either financial incentives for
compliance or penalties (such as loss of Federal funds) for
noncompliance.
3. Command plus conditional preemption: The Federal govern-
ment orders States to enact a regulatory system that adopts Fed-
eral standards. If a State does not comply, the Federal
government implements the standards within the state, ousting
the State from regulatory jurisdiction over the matter. No other
penalty (such as loss of Federal funds) is assessed against a non-
complying, nonparticipating State.
4. Command, conditional preemption, plus State fee: The Fed-
eral government commands States to engage in a particular reg-
ulatory activity. If the State fails to do so or declines the
"invitation" to regulate according to Federal norms, the Federal
government implements the program within the noncomplying
State and charges the State a fee or tax for the regulatory
program.
5. Command, conditional preemption, plus private sector tax:
The Federal program commands States to undertake regulation
in a particular arena according to Federal standards. Where a
State declines to employ its powers in the Federally defined
manner, the Federal government implements its program within
the State. The Federal government then levies a special tax
against private individuals and entities resident within the non-
complying State who are related in some way to the Federal reg-
ulatory program.
6. Private sector penalties for State nonparticipation: The Federal
government invites but does not command State participation in
a Federal regulatory program. In States declining to participate,
the Federal government does not institute a default regulatory
program. It exacts certain penalties (excluding direct taxes) not
against the.State but against activities of private individuals and
entities within the noncomplying State.
7. Command plus extraordinary inducement/penalty: The Fed-
eral government instructs States to implement Federal standards
and attempts to induce them to comply by extraordinary finan-
cial incentives. If a State chooses not to comply, the Federal
government neither implements the program within the State
nor exacts financial penalties other than the withdrawal of eligi-
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bility for certain significant Federal grant programs. The Fed-
eral strategy is to give sufficiently high rewards for participation,
and penalties for nonparticipation, such that politically and eco-
nomically no State finds it possible to refuse.
The balance of this Part establishes the nature and role of these
models by examining their function within the larger objectives and
mechanics of the pending health reform plans. Because the more am-
bitious reform proposals tend to borrow features from the more
"modest" or incremental approaches, the modest approaches are dis-
cussed first; the distinction between the two groups is whether a plan
contains mechanisms to achieve universal coverage.
B. The Modest or Incremental Approaches
Three of the seven pending health reform plans are based on the
argument that thoughtful restructuring of the health insurance mar-
ketplace, combined with reformed tax incentives, will conduce to
achieve broader health insurance coverage. These reforms deserve to
be tested, their proponents submit, before determining whether fur-
ther reform is required to expand coverage still more broadly.
1. The Medical Savings Accounts Approach (Coats-Gramm-Lugar)
One of the most limited bills pending thus far seeks to employ
one mechanism-preferential tax treatment for contributions to indi-
vidual medical savings accounts-to facilitate both broader access to
health insurance and reduced overall health spending. The Coats-
Gramm-Lugar bill39 would create tax incentives for individuals to be-
come self-insurers for routine medical matters via medical savings ac-
counts (MSAs). These medical accounts, which are modeled after
individual retirement accounts (IRAs), would be funded by pre-tax
income, rendering the amounts employees contribute free from Fed-
eral income tax.40 The plan provides that if the account balance is not
exhausted during the calendar year, the taxpayer can roll the funds
over into an IRA or maintain them in the MSA for use in the follow-
ing year. Only employed individuals and their families would be eligi-
39. S. 1105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). When the bill was introduced on June 15,
1993, it was sponsored by three Republicans, Senators Coats, Gramm, and Lugar. Senator
Gramm later introduced a separate health reform bill that incorporated the medical sav-
ings account approach and added some provisions to redress problems identified in other
bills, including malpractice litigation and Medicaid reform. See S. 1807, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994). Senator Gramm's bill was co-sponsored by 10 Senators as of February 23,
1994. Id. Its late date of introduction barred more detailed analysis in this Article.
40. Employers may also make tax-sheltered contributions to the savings accounts, up
to specified annual maximums. See S. 1105 § 1(a).
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ble to use this medical account device, and only if the employer
maintained a catastrophic health insurance policy for such employ-
ees.4' Thus, employees who remained on a fee-for-service indemnity
plan, such as traditional Blue Cross, for example, could not set up tax-
free medical savings accounts.
The theory of the plan is relatively simple. First, it seeks to ex-
pand access to health care among those not currently covered under
an employer's plan by providing incentives for employers to offer a
new low-cost option for health insurance. Second, without creating an
expensive new government bureaucracy, the bill attempts to restruc-
ture some consumers' behavior so that they will cease bidding up
medical prices. Finally, the plan aims to utilize Federal funds to ex-
pand access to health care in a manner having low governmental
transaction costs. Otherwise, the plan would leave the status quo
alone. Thus, both governmental programs, such as Medicare and
Medicaid, and the private health insurance system would not be di-
rectly affected by the Coats-Gramm-Lugar proposal.42 It avoids the
contentious debates surrounding universal coverage and cost contain-
ment controls simply by sidestepping these and the other more ambi-
tious objectives of other plans.
Nor would State governments be affected; the plan bypasses all of
the policy thickets that involve State regulatory apparatus. Medical
malpractice litigation reform and State regulation of health insurance,
for instance, are not mentioned in the plan. Nor does it seek any Fed-
eral preemption of State law. The most succinctly written of the pend-
ing proposals evaluated here, it would effect amendments only to the
Internal Revenue Code. None of the models of potentially problem-
atic Federal legislation are at issue in this bill.
2. The House Republican Plan (Michel)
Republican leaders of the House of Representatives43 have intro-
duced a bill that ostensibly offers "simple and common sense" re-
41. S. 1105 § 529(b)(1)(A)(1). Catastrophic insurance incorporates large annual de-
ductibles, such as $2000 or $5000. Its premiums are far cheaper than either fee-for-service
or managed health care (health maintenance organization and preferred provider organi-
zation) plans, thus providing an incentive for employers to provide basic health insurance
for their employees.
42. By creating additional financial incentives for employers not presently purchasing
insurance for their employees to buy catastrophic health insurance, this reform program
would engender new business for private health insurers.
43. This bill parts company from the bill of the Senate Republican leadership, who
formed the Task Force on Health Reform to fashion a singular Republican alternative to
the President's Plan. See infra text accompanying notes 103-24 (Chafee bill).
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forms.' The "Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1993"14 attempts
to achieve most of the august goals of the more elaborate plans. Its
strategy differs somewhat, however, for it employs existing structures
and programs, and does not impose any mandates on employers to
subsidize or purchase health insurance for their employees. 46 Never-
theless, hidden in the plan lie relatively radical Federal incursions into
State government control over the State's purse and over certain State
regulatory matters, including most prominently medical malpractice
actions.
Certain features of the Michel Bill are somewhat less intrusive to
State authority. It focuses on reforming aspects of the insurance mar-
ket in order to enhance the market power of small business and lower
their costs of purchasing health insurance. It permits small employers
to join voluntary purchasing cooperatives to spread the risk over a
larger pool of insureds and to facilitate joint efforts to negotiate prices
and terms.47 The bill requires every health insurer to offer at least one
standard health insurance option, and one catastrophic plan, for all
employers in its geographic area having between two and fifty em-
ployees. 48 Premium increases for small employers are limited.49 The
bill also proposes certain health insurance reforms to expand coverage
further, such as constraining insurers' treatment of pre-existing condi-
tions, and guaranteeing the renewability of insurance.50
Like the Coats-Gramm-Lugar bill, the Michel proposal uses tax
incentives to expand access to health insurance coverage. It adopts
the individual medical savings account approach as one option for ex-
panding access and offering a limited government subsidy. All em-
ployers are required to offer their employees the option of at least one
standard coverage insurance plan"1 and one catastrophic insurance
44. See 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. 178, d22 (Westlaw BNA ver., Sept. 16, 1993) (comment
of Rep. Robert Michel in introducing the bill, H.R. 3080, on September 15, 1993). The bill
was co-sponsored by 106 House members.
45. H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
46. Nor would it impose a mandate on individuals to purchase health insurance, as
does the Senate Republican Task Force bill. See infra text accompanying note 108.
47. Some States have already established these purchasing cooperatives. Like most
other bills that utilize the purchasing cooperatives idea, the Michel bill would provide a
Federal regulatory structure governing the creation and operation of these cooperatives.
H.R. 3080 § 1211
48. H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001(a) (1993).
49. Id. §§ 1011-13.
50. Id. § 1001(c)(2).
51. The benefits package of the standard acute-care plan is not specified in the bill but
would be determined by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Id.
§ 1103(a)(1).
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plan which incorporates the tax-free medical savings account.52 To
further expand access to health care services (as opposed to health
insurance), community and migrant health centers receive substan-
tially expanded budgets for direct health services delivery. Although
the plan does not achieve universal health insurance coverage, it ar-
guably greatly expands access to health services.53
Much of the Michel bill borrows from other earlier proposals, but
in one area-its directions to State governments-it charts relatively
new territory. The bill raises colorable Tenth Amendment or spend-
ing power issues under four of the models of problematic Federal-
State relations.
The bill directly orders the States to "implement and enforce"
Federal regulatory standards by enacting their own regulatory system
that adopts the Federal substantive and procedural standards.54 If a
State does not comply, the Federal Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) implements the standards within the State and ousts
the State from regulatory jurisdiction over the subject matter until the
State regulates in accordance with the Federal standards.55 For this
first set of commands, no penalties, such as loss of Federal funds, are
assessed against noncomplying states. 6 This is an example of the
command plus conditional preemption model of Federal-State
relations.
The Michel bill's second type of problematic instruction com-
mands State governments to engage in a particular activity, and in-
structs that if any fails to do so, an agency of the Federal government
will intercede to realize the statutory objectives. But distinguishing
52. Requiring employers to offer their employees certain insurance options does not
require them to pay any portion of the premiums. To encourage employers to subsidize
employees' purchase of the catastrophic insurance plan, the bill exempts employer contri-
butions from social security and unemployment taxes. See id. at H.R. 3080 § 2202(d). The
bill also permits employees to pay premiums for catastrophic insurance from pretax in-
come. Id. § 2201.
53. The plan proposes to achieve its financing primarily from reducing Medicare subsi-
dies, shifting funds from existing government programs, and reducing other Federal
programs.
54. H.R. 3080 § 1103(b)(1)(A) provides: "Each State shall submit to the Secretary [of
HHS], by the deadline specified in subparagraph (B), a report on steps the State is taking
to implement and enforce the consumer protection standards with respect to insurers, and
MedAccess plans offered, not later than such deadline." See also id. § 1103(b)(2)(A) (re-
quiring report to HIS on steps State is taking "to implement and enforce MedAccess
standards").
55. H.R. 3080 § 1103(b)(2).
56. This feature, as well as the bill's other language, suggests that Congress would
enact these standards as instances of the commerce power.
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this model from the first, the Federal government charges the State
government a fee for the costs incurred in the Federal intercession.
This is the model of command, conditional preemption, and State fee.
The Michel bill employs this model's techniques in two discrete
areas. In one instance, it commands States to fashion an alternative
dispute processing system in accordance with specified procedural and
substantive Federal medical malpractice standards. In particular, the
bill mandates that as a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a medical
malpractice claim in any court, a plaintiff must first submit the dispute
to a qualified Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) panel.5 7 Any
State that does not enact an ADR system for medical malpractice
cases consistent with the Federal procedural and substantive standards
will find itself saddled with the statutory default mechanism: the
United States Department of Justice establishes and subjects the State
to the ADR system. In addition, a Federal tax is assessed against the
State government to cover the costs of operating the Federal ADR
system.5s
In the other instance, the Michel bill mandates State governments
to develop and implement a program to collect and distribute compar-
ative information on health care services and insurance plans. While
the bill authorizes some Federal grant money to coax States in devel-
oping the program, it directs the Federal government to charge non-
complying States for its services in implementing the Federal
information program.59 While it is not unknown for the Federal gov-
ernment to charge private entities for the cost of the regulatory system
supervising their activities,60 levying a charge exclusively against State
governments for the costs of maintaining a Federal regulatory appara-
tus appears unique. 1
57. The constitutionality of the Federal government instituting a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to a State claim in State court is itself problematic. That question is beyond the
boundaries of this Article, however.
58. H.R. 3080 at § 2032(b)(3)(A).
59. See id. § 2122.
60. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 431.53 (1989) (noting fees specified for FDA review of antibi-
otic drug applications); John Henkel, User Fees to Fund Faster Revenues, FDA CONSUMER,
Oct. 1993, at 19 (describing FDA charges to drug companies); Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (upholding aircraft regulatory fee levied against private and
government actors).
61. The Michel bill includes an additional sanction for noncompliance besides the
monetary assessment for ADR costs: the State (including its local government units) is
ineligible for funds under the Public Health Service Act. H.R. 3080 § 2032(b)(3)(B). This
provision may suggest that the ADR mandate actually proceeds as spending power cooper-
ative federalism.
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The third model of problematic Federal-State relations in the
Michel bill lies in its order that States establish a reinsurance mecha-
nism.62 If the State does not comply, the Federal government pro-
vides a regulatory default, funded by a special Federal tax placed
exclusively on insurers offering health insurance within the nonpartici-
pating State.63 This bill thus employs the model of conditional pre-
emption and private sector tax.
The fourth problematic model employed by the Michel bill di-
rectly commands States to institute a "risk management program"-to
be imposed upon both medical service providers and insurersf a It dif-
fers from the first model in that, should a State not comply, the Fed-
eral government will not institute the program itself. The command to
States to regulate is not fortified with either incentives (such as new
funds) to encourage the States to undertake the regulation, nor with
penalties for a State's failure to comply (such as debarment from cer-
tain grant programs). This is the model of untethered regulatory
command.
3. The "Pure Managed Competition" Plan (Cooper)
Like most other bills, the one sponsored by Representative James
Cooper 65 seeks to reform the insurance market for small business and
individuals and to revise tax incentives to restructure consumers' be-
havior. The mechanism found in most other proposed bills, the re-
gional cooperative through which small businesses and individuals
may purchase insurance, also forms a centerpiece of this reform plan.
For those employers already paying the premiums for their employ-
62. H.R. 3080 § 1106(b)(1). Various techniques have been fashioned, predominantly
by statutory law, to provide coverage for risks that the insurance industry declines to cover
within the voluntary market. These residual or secondary market techniques, such as as-
signed risk pools and reinsurance, have been developed over the last half-century. As-
signed risk pool statutes force insurers to contribute funds to a pool providing coverage for
groups or individuals who would otherwise be unable to obtain coverage from private in-
surers. They have been employed in auto insurance, see, e.g., Cal. Ins. Code §§ 11620-
11627 (West 1988), and workers' compensation, see, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59A-33-1 to
59A-33-15 (Michie 1992). Secondary market techniques are discussed in INSURANCE SERV-
ICES OFFIcE, OvERvmw: RESIDUAL MARKET MECHANISMS (1988), reprinted in Kenneth S.
Abraham, INSURANcE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 710-15 (1990).
63. Id. § 1106(b)(2)(d).
64. See id. § 2043.
65. H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Senators Breaux, Durenberger, Lieber-
man, and Nunn introduced a companion bill in the Senate, S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(Oct. 21, 1993). The Senate bill bore the same short title as the Cooper bill, the Managed
Competition Act of 1993. While it differs in some respects from the Cooper bill, those
differences are generally not germane to the problems explored in this Article.
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ees' health insurance, the reform plan modifies Federal tax incentives
to encourage employers to reduce their financial contributions, con-
comitantly reducing the benefits of the plans they offer employees.
Because under the plan the tax deductibility of employer contribu-
tions is no longer unlimited, employers cannot deduct premium costs
in excess of the basic plan's cost. The plan purports, however, to rely
upon individual and business choice, for it does not compel either in-
dividuals or employers to purchase insurance. By restructuring the
marketplace in a variety of ways, the plan's proponents believe the
cost of insurance will fall and the number of purchasers of health in-
surance will increase. Hence, they argue, the goal of attaining virtu-
ally universal access to health coverage will eventually be achieved
through market forces and tax incentives, at lower cost to the taxpay-
ers and with less havoc for those currently insured.66
In introducing his bill,67 Representative Cooper asserted his view
of the appropriate role of State governments in achieving health re-
form. Criticizing the President's plan, Representative Cooper con-
tended that no bill should authorize "excessive State flexibility," and
specifically rebuked those who would accord States the option to insti-
tute a single-payer plan.6 8 His bill would constrain State regulatory
power significantly, in part by broad preemption provisions. But po-
tential Tenth Amendment trouble arises not from preemption but
from provisions that largely track Representative Michel's bill.69
The Cooper bill contains a version of the model of untethered reg-
ulatory command where it commands States to enact enabling legisla-
tion under which the insurance purchasing cooperatives can be
66. In other features, the plan would replace Medicaid with a new Federal subsidy for
the indigent to assist them in purchasing their own insurance coverage through the regional
cooperatives. H.R. 3222 § 2002 (authorizing subsidies); § 2301 (repealing Medicaid). It
implicitly forswears price controls, such as premium caps and a global national health care
budget. It would further encourage the group or network practice of medicine. Id.
§ 1222(a)(6).
67. When introduced, the bill was co-sponsored by 27 Democrats and 19 Republicans.
68. Rep. Cooper's Managed Competition Bill Draws Bipartisan Support of 46
Lawmakers, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. 193 d14 (Oct. 7,1993). Proponents of this bill contend it
safely charts a course between the Scylla of a laissez-faire health services marketplace and
the Charybdis formed by the other option, the single-payer system, which managed care
proponents perceive as an execration. They believe the single-payer system's replacement
of private insurers with a government regulatory behemoth would undermine the para-
mount values of health care quality and economy. Id.
69. The substantial overlap may thus indicate some successes of a trade lobby-here,
the health insurance industry.
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established, 70 but does not specify that a Federal program will ensue
should any State not enact the requisite enabling legislation.7 1 The
bill also employs the model of command, conditional preemption, plus
State fee in a manner similar to Representative Michel's bill. As in the
Michel bill, the Cooper plan requires States to establish an ADR sys-
tem that satisfies Federal standards for medical malpractice cases,7 2
and mandates as well that if a State does not comply, the statutory
default mechanism will be triggered: the Federal ADR system will be
instituted within the State.73 Also, like the Michel bill, the Cooper bill
proposes to transfer the costs of maintaining this default mechanism
to the State government, but in a different manner from the Michel
plan. The Cooper bill specifies that the State will have to pay HHS a
liquidated amount for this regulatory "service": 110% of the actual
costs incurred by the Federal government per annum in maintaining
the Federal ADR system in the State.74
C. The Ambitious Plans
Four bills that explicitly seek to achieve universal coverage are
currently pending in Congress.75 While their timetables and strategies
70. H.R. 3222 § 1101(b)(1) provides: "Each State shall provide, by legislation or other-
wise, for the establishment by not later than July 1, 1994, as a not-for-profit corporation,
with respect to [each geographic area] a health plan purchasing cooperative.. .. "
71. Because the purchasing cooperatives constitute a pivotal part of the reform pack-
age, perhaps the omission was inadvertent. Its constitutionality may change depending
upon the type of incentives or default mechanism an amended bill would propose.
72. Whether a State's ADR system satisfies the Federal requirements, and thus per-
mits the State to avoid the Federal ADR and its direct taxation of State government, is left
solely in the hands of the Secretary of HHS, who is requested to consult with the Attorney
General. Id. § 5202(a). The Cooper bill also features prototypical and noncontroversial
Federal grant programs to entice State governments into certain activities, but without any
sanctions if they decline the offers. See, e.g., § 5203.
73. H.R. 3222 § 5202(b).
74. H.R. 3222 § 5202(b)(3) provides:
If the alternative Federal ADR system established under this subsection is ap-
plied with respect to a State for a calendar year, the State shall make a payment
to the United States (at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may re-
quire) in an amount equal to 110% of the costs incurred by the United States
during the year as a result of the application of the system with respect to the
State.
75. Two of the more ambitious plans are sponsored primarily by Democrats-the
Clinton bill and the single-payer (Wellstone-McDermott) plan. Senate Republicans willing
to undertake a complete overhaul of the health care system and who commit to universal
coverage have likewise split into two groups. The Senate Republican Task Force on Health
Care, led by Senators Chafee and Dole, produced "HEART"--the Health Equity and Ac-
cess Reform Today Act of 1993. Senators Nickles and Hatch introduced a bill that at-
tempts to straddle the political fence between the incremental approaches and the Senate
Republican Task Force's bill. S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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differ substantially, they tend to share some regulatory structures in
pursuit of that goal.
1. The Clinton Plan
By far the most comprehensive and ambitious proposal for health
care reform is that produced by the Clinton Administration. The
President campaigned in part on a platform promising an overhaul of
the health care system to assure greater access and reduced costs. In
September 1993 a narrative description of the President's proposed
omnibus plan was released unofficially, later followed by the bill it-
self.7 6 Spokespersons openly acknowledged that the original plan had
been formulated and proposed without the benefit of constitutional
analyses.7 1 Excepting only the single-payer bill, the Clinton bill ac-
cords the most policy discretion to States of any major reform bill.78
The Administration describes its proposal as based on "managed
competition," a theory contending that, if structured properly, market
forces can provide sufficient options for quality care at lower costs. Its
advocates maintain that the savings accruing from increased competi-
tion can be plowed back into the system to finance expansion of cov-
erage to the uninsured and underinsured. Reform of the health
insurance marketplace is thus a paramount regulatory goal, achieved
in this program through the establishment of regional purchasing co-
operatives-termed "alliances." Under the President's plan, however,
membership in an alliance is mandatory for all unemployed individu-
76. See Clinton Description, supra note 1. Although prior reports had denominated
Clinton's plan "The American Health Security Act of 1993," see, e.g., id., the President was
forced to relinquish that title because the single-payer bill claimed it first. It is now denom-
inated the "Health Security Act," S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter HSA].
As this Article goes to press, the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee,
chaired by Representative Pete Stark, approved by a close vote a marked up version of the
Presidents bill. The subcommittee's bill deleted the President's proposal for mandatory
health dalliances and fashioned different mechanisms to contain spiraling prices for health
services. A significant amount of the President's proposals, however, remains intact at this
early syage, including the commitment yo universal coverage, although the provisions de-
lineating financing and regulatory oversight are expected to undergo major revision. See
Ways-Means Panel's Experience Shows Congress Ready to Scale Back Plan, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No.50, at D-20 (Mar. 29, 1994).
77. See Pear, supra, note 1, at Al. In contrast to the narrative description of the Presi-
dent's program, see Clinton Description, supra note 1, the proposed bill seems to have
received the benefit of sophisticated constitutional lawyers' evaluation, for it departs in
several ways from the prior presentation.
78. In the proposed congressional findings, the bill States that as one principle for any
health reform plan, "a partnership between the Federal Government and each State should
allow the State and its local communities to design an effective, high-quality system of care
that serves the residents of the State ... ." HSA § 2(2)(H).
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als and for businesses employing fewer than a certain number of peo-
ple.7 9 The alliance exercises certain regulatory powers, including the
ability to select which insurance plans will be offered to the alliance's
members. To ensure fair "community rating" of insurance, alliances
would be quite large. A State could choose, for example, to establish
only one alliance covering its entire population. Larger corporations
could opt out of the alliance structure and negotiate directly with in-
surers over the plans they would offer to their employees.8 0 A new
Federal regulatory agency, the National Health Board, would have
rulemaking and enforcement powers over significant portions of the
Act.8' Other provisions define the comprehensive benefit package,82
permit States to establish single-payer systems, 83 require the integra-
tion of mental health and substance abuse services, 84 establish new
public health initiatives for preventive medicine and biomedical and
health services research,85 reform Medicare and Medicaid,8 6 institute
an ADR mechanism as a prerequisite to medical malpractice ac-
tions,87 modify certain tax incentives,88 and create private rights of ac-
tion against various governmental entities for enforcement of rights
created under the Act.89
Breathtakingly broad in scope, the Clinton Plan begins by creat-
ing an individual entitlement to health benefits.90 The benefits, how-
ever, will be available only where the new regulatory and market
apparatus has been established. States ostensibly may choose whether
to enact enabling legislation and regulations under which to become a
79. The President's plan currently states that employers with between 100 and 5000
employees are required to join alliances. Id. §§ 1311(c)(1)(B), 1311(e)(3). Recent news
reports suggest the President is willing to compromise on the employer size required to
join alliances. Gwen Ifil, Clinton Defends Insurance Pools in Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1994, at A8. Medicare beneficiaries would retain their benefits unless the State
opts to fold them into the alliances and their approved insurance policies. Medicaid cover-
age would be retained for individuals receiving long-term nursing care but other benefi-
ciaries would be shifted to the alliances.
80. Id. § 1311.
81. See, e.g., id. §§ 1151-1154.
82. Id. § 1101(a).
83. Id. § 1221.
84. Id. § 3511(a).
85. Id. §§ 3301-3334.
86. Id. §§ 4000-4301.
87. Id. § 5302(a).
88. Id. §§ 7801-7802.
89. Id. §§ 5235-5243.
90. HSA § 1001(a) ("Entitlement to Health Benefits") provides: "[E]ach eligible indi-
vidual is entitled to the comprehensive benefit package ... through the applicable health
plan in which the individual is enrolled consistent with this title."
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"participating state" 91 or to forfeit both the regulatory field to the
Federal government and the substantial funds that would be appropri-
ated. If a State applies to become a participant, it would find its regu-
latory power and responsibilities greatly expanded over the status
quo.92
According States the option whether to participate would seem to
bring the plan into the conventionally approved scope of the spending
power.93 But a closer reading highlights some potentially problematic
aspects. The Clinton act applies to all employers-including State and
local governments.94 It extends Medicare coverage and the hospital
insurance tax to all State and local employees.95 While Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,96 lends support for conclud-
ing that these are permissible uses of Federal power, this approach-
Federal regulation of non-Federal public sector employee benefits-
nevertheless deserves attention as a separate model of Federal-State
relations.
A second potential Federal-State problem of the Clinton plan lies
in the array of sanctions the plan visits upon States that choose not to
participate. The bill provides for Federal assumption of responsibili-
ties to create and monitor the alliances within States that are nonpar-
91. Id. § 1006; see also id. § 1200(a) (defining "participating State" and its prerequi-
sites). This bill's tone differs dramatically from the other bills. It is careful not to issue
commands to States; it invites the States to participate in the new reforms. Given the
severe penalties for not participating, this tone of "invitation" may seem more formal than
substantive.
92. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461,
has a broad preemption provision, id. § 1144, which in concert with other sections has
been interpreted to bar State regulation of various aspects of employee health insurance
purchased by employers. See, e.g., Parmet, supra note 2, at 132-40 (1993). Some of this
regulatory power would be delegated to States via the Clinton proposal.
HSA § 1201 purports to summarize State responsibilities under the Act: establishing
one or more regional alliances; certifying health plans according to certain criteria jointly
fashioned between Federal and State law; assuring the financial solvency of health plans;
coordinating the State program with Federal law; conforming State laws to the provisions
of workers' compensation and automobile insurance reform specified in the Federal act.
But the HSA is replete with instructions and mandates to States; section 1201's summary is
by no means exhaustive.
93. Modem courts have upheld spending power legislation as long as its substantive
provisions do not violate a specific check on the Federal power. See JoN E. NowAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrtUTIONAL LAW § 5.6 (4th ed. 1991); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding establishment of a Presidential Election Campaign
Fund); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
94. HSA § 7301; see also id. § 1001.
95. Given Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social See. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41
(1986), and Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528 (1985), these additional employment taxes are not
problematic.
96. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
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ticipants, or that have had their status as a participant terminated.
7
In States subject to Federal operation of the system, the insurance
premiums sold through the regional alliances will be subject to a 15%
surcharge, ostensibly to reimburse HHS for its administrative costs in
establishing and operating the system.98 The bill further specifies that
the surcharge shall be treated as part of the premium cost for pur-
poses of complying with the Federally set global budget and per capita
insurance limits.99 Because the plan proposes to collect the surcharge
from individuals and employers obtaining insurance through regional
alliances rather than directly from the State,1°° it generates a distinct
model for analysis, termed here command, conditional preemption,
plus private sector tax.
A third potentially problematic section of the Clinton bill lies in
the provisions encouraging a State to develop for Federal approval a
regulatory program that governs the sale of long-term care insurance.
The bill handles this by an ingenious form of conditional preemption:
if a State fails to establish a Federally approved State plan for this
activity, "no insurer may sell or offer for sale any long-term care insur-
ance policy" in the State.10' This provision is enforceable via a civil
action against insurers."02 This novel approach to compelling State
participation will be termed the model of private sector penalties for
State nonparticipation.
97. See HSA §§ 1521-1522.
98. HSA § 1523(a) reads:
If this subpart [Responsibilities in Absence of State Systems] applies to a State
for a calendar year, the premiums charged under the regional alliance established
and operated by the Secretary in the State shall be equal to premiums that would
otherwise be charged under a regional alliance established and operated by the
State, increased by 15 percent. Such 15 percent increase shall be used to reim-
burse the Secretary for any administrative or other expenses incurred as a result
of establishing and operating the system.
Note that the surcharge would be assessed only against the premiums of plans sold through
the regional alliances, not through the private corporate alliances.
99. Id. § 1523(b). This proviso could result in a net reduction of health benefits.
100. Id. § 1523(a). The President's bill contemplates that State and local employees,
like their Federal counterparts, would obtain their insurance through the regional alliances.
This is inferred from the provisions exempting only the employees of corporate alliances
from regional alliances, see id. § 1311; see generally id. §§ 1300-30; Clinton Description,
supra note 1. Combined with the mandate for employers to pay 80% of insurance costs for
their employees, the surcharge would be felt directly by employees and employers-which
include all the governmental entities that employ.
101. HSA § 2346.
102. Id. § 2346(b).
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2. The Senate Republican Task Force Proposal (Chafee)
Recognizing the priority that both the public and President Clin-
ton place on health care reform, in early 1993 Republican Senators
formed a task force to develop an alternative comprehensive reform
plan. Led by Senator Chafee, the Senate Republican task force
worked during roughly the same period as President Clinton's staff.
Shortly after the White House released a description of the Presi-
dent's proposal in September 1993, Senator Chafee announced that
the task force bill would be introduced in a few weeks.10 3 At one
time, the Republicans hoped to unite their party in support of the task
force's bill. On November 22, 1993, months after its expected intro-
duction, the bill was finally presented,1°4 but with far fewer sponsors
than originally expected and after many of its most innovative ideas
had been borrowed by sponsors of competing bills filed earlier." 5
Like the Clinton bill, the Chafee proposal attempts to achieve
comprehensive health reform, including universal coverage, but plans
to do so without creating a new Federal entitlement to health care.
While this may seem a contradiction in terms, the bill creates a regula-
tory system under which every citizen and lawful permanent resident
is provided access to health insurance coverage.'0 6 Like most of the
other pending bills, it would maintain the private health insurance sys-
tem but reform the market in order to achieve a managed competition
system. It relies upon insurance purchasing cooperatives, termed here
"purchasing groups," but only for small employers (under 100 em-
ployees) and individuals. In contrast to the Clinton plan, the Chafee
bill does not mandate employer or individual participation in a
purchasing group. Moreover, the bill permits more than one purchas-
ing group to be established within the same geographic area, thus per-
mitting competition between groups to retain their members.
103. See Senate GOP Unveils Reform Plan with Tax Cap, Individual Mandate, 1993
Daily Lab. Rep. d 14 (Westlaw BNA ver. Sept. 16, 1993).
104. S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
105. When S. 1770 was introduced, only 18 Senators listed their names as sponsors. All
are Republicans and virtually all known as moderates. More conservative Republican Sen-
ators withdrew their support earlier in the fall of 1993. See Jack Anderson and Michael
Binstein, Health Reform Divides GOP Senators, WASH. POsT, Aug. 12, 1993, at S12. Con-
servative Republican Senators objected to a wide range of the Task Force's conclusions,
with Senator McCain "quipping that North Korea and Cuba were the only places left on
earth where cooperatives were still in vogue." Id.
106. S. 1770 § 1001 provides: "Each individual or lawful permanent resident of the
United States is provided access to health insurance coverage under a qualified health plan
under this title."
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Even with these and other reforms of the insurance market, a
significant number of individuals will be unable to afford the costs of
basic health insurance without government assistance. The bill main-
tains Medicaid and Medicare, with certain reforms, in order to pro-
vide insurance coverage for substantial numbers of individuals. For
the balance of low-income, uninsured individuals, the Chafee bill pro-
vides a decade-long phase-in of Federally funded vouchers with which
individuals and families can purchase insurance through the purchas-
ing groups.10 7
The Chafee bill also parts company with the Clinton bill regard-
ing who pays for health insurance for the employed. Unlike the Clin-
ton plan, which directs employers to pay most of the premium costs of
health insurance for their employees, the Chafee bill does not contain
an employer mandate. Instead, after the decade long phase-in, indi-
viduals are required to maintain health insurance, suffering significant
tax penalties if they do not. 08 The Chafee bill continues the existing
system of voluntary employer-provided health insurance, but places a
cap on the tax deductibility of these expenses, per employee, to en-
courage employers to pay for only standard coverage. Any employer
payments for health insurance beyond the standard coverage is taxa-
ble to the employee as ordinary income.'0 9 The bill does require em-
ployers to make enrollment in a health plan available to all their
employees, regardless of who pays the premiums, and to administer
payroll deductions for insurance premiums. Large employers, which
apparently include State governments and many municipal govern-
ments, 10 are permitted three options: form purchasing groups with
other large employers, negotiate directly with insurers over the plans
they want to offer their employees, or self-insure. As with the small
employer and individual plans, the plans that large employers offer to
employees must meet specified standards."'
107. To permit the Federal government to realize savings from the reforms as a whole
and thus pay for the vouchers without requiring substantially increased taxes, the voucher
phase-in period runs from the date of enactment to 2005. Id. § 1003.
108. See id. § 2401. This individual mandate to maintain health insurance is analogous
to the established mandate to purchase automobile liability insurance as a prerequisite to
driving an automobile.
109. Id. § 2001.
110. See id. § 1601(24)(a) (defining a small employer as one with less than 100 employ-
ees on a typical business day); § 1601(17) (defining a large employer as anything other than
small employer). No special rules for States or State instrumentalities as employers are
established in the bill.
111. These standards include: guaranteed availability to all employees (with specified
exceptions for collectively bargained plans), id. §§ 1202(a)(2)(D), 1203(a)(3); no discrimi-
nation on the basis of health status, id. § 1202(B); standardized information for evaluating
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The bill would establish a Federal regulatory system over which
three major entities will exercise jurisdiction: two existing Depart-
ments, Health and Human Services and Labor, and a new Benefits
Commission." 2 Other provisions specify the items and services re-
quired in the standard and catastrophic benefit packages," 3 prohibit
States from establishing single-payer systems," 4 establish a new public
health trust fund for biomedical research," 5 reform Medicare and
Medicaid,"16 and modify certain tax incentives primarily to expand the
availability of health insurance."17 Notably, once the plan is fully
phased in, the bill plans to impose a special tax on any uninsured
individuals.1 1 8
While the Chafee bill seeks to establish a partnership with State
governments and to vest them with significant regulatory responsibil-
ity, in contrast to virtually all of the other pending bills evaluated
here,1 9 it contains a remarkable paucity of provisions that putatively
offend the Tenth Amendment or spending power. The bill does com-
mand States to establish the regulatory system necessary to implement
the Federal reforms,' 20 but States ostensibly retain the option not to
participate. The bill provides that where a State fails to undertake or
maintain its role, the Secretary of Health and Human Services will
"assume, with respect to insured health plans and groups in the State,
the responsibilities of the State with such a program .... ,,121 Hence,
the bill creates a Federal default mechanism in case of State noncom-
pliance. Notably absent from the bill are any financial or other penal-
plans' performance, id. § 1202(a)(2)(E); the offering of both standard and catastrophic
benefit plans, id. § 1203; financial solvency criteria, id. § 1202(b)(2)(A); and, mediation
procedures for hearing and resolving malpractice claims, id. § 1202(b)(2)(C).
112. Id. §§ 1311-1315.
113. Id. § 1301.
114. Id. § 1421(d).
115. Id. § 6097.
116. Id. §§ 6011, 6021, 6031 (Medicaid), 6101-6139 (Medicare).
117. Id. §§ 1002, 2002.
118. Id. § 2401(b)(1).
119. One exception is the Medical Savings Account plan (Coats-Gramm-Lugar). S.
1105.
120. S. 1770 § 1401(a) reads: "Each State shall establish a program (in this part referred
to as a "State program") to carry out State responsibilities specified in this part." The bill
specifies the responsibilities placed on States, which include: certification of insurance
plans as "qualified insured health plans"; enforcement of the insurance reform standards;
dissemination of certain types of information about available health insurance plans; estab-
lishment of procedures for creating and operating purchasing groups; creating a risk adjust-
ment program; development of a binding arbitration process; and specification of an
"open-season" for annual enrollment in health plans. See id. § 1401(b)(1)-(7).
121. Id § 1401(d)(3).
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ties for State noncompliance; after notice and a forbearance period,
the Federal government simply assumes the regulatory jurisdiction
and shoulders its costs. Thus, the Chafee bill employs the command
plus conditional preemption model here.
The bill employs the command plus conditional preemption
model in another area as well. Like many other bills, it outlines sev-
eral permissible formats for the ADR system and commands States to
establish such a process for medical malpractice claims.122 If a State
fails to do so, "the Secretary [of HHS] shall provide for the operation
of an approved alternative dispute resolution method in such State
until such time as a system under this part is adopted."''" Again, the
bill forgoes the strategies of the other bills to extract payments from
State governments to fund the Federal regulatory program.
The last potential Federal-State problem of the Chafee plan lies
in its application to all employers-including State and local govern-
ments. 2 4 Under Garcia, these apparently are permissible exercises of
the Federal commerce power. Nevertheless, this approach will receive
further scrutiny as an instance of Federal regulation of non-Federal
public sector employee benefits. Given that the Chafee bill is an ambi-
tious and comprehensive plan to overhaul the nation's health care sys-
tem, it is truly exceptional for eschewing the aggressive actions against
State governments that pervade most of the other bills.
3. The "Consumer Choice" Plan (Nickles-Hatch)
A latecomer to the health reform sweepstakes, the "Consumer
Choice Health Security Act"" seeks to chart a middle course be-
tween Senator Chafee's bill for the Senate Republican task force, with
its mandate on individuals to purchase health insurance, and the Coats
plan, which contains the most modest reforms of all pending bills.
Senator Nickles's plan is driven by the proposition that consumers are
more frugal when they are spending their own money than when
spending money from some other source, such as that from their em-
ployers or the government. Thus, the Nickles plan has employers,
who are currently paying for employee health insurance, allocate
those funds directly to individual employees' medical savings ac-
counts.'26 Individual employees then decide how to use the money,
122. See id. § 4013(b)-(c).
123. Id. § 4013(e).
124. The bill does not single out State and local government employees from the opera-
tion of the plan, nor does it provide any special rules for them, as does the Clinton plan.
125. S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
126. See id. § 102.
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including how much to spend on health insurance versus uninsured
health services. The medical savings accounts into which these contri-
butions would flow form a principal element of the Nickles plan. But
the holder of the account is not entitled to a tax exclusion on its bal-
ance or on accruing interest. 27 Under the Nickles plan, tax credits are
available only to the contributors of monies to the accounts,128 regard-
less of whether the contributions come from employers or employees.
To encourage all individuals to purchase health insurance,
whether through their employer or, if unemployed, on the open mar-
ket, the plan accords all individuals, regardless of employment status,
a tax credit for their health expenses. 129 Proponents of this plan argue
that this restructuring of tax incentives and benefits awards the largest
government subsidy directly to those most in need of it-the indigent
and the very ill; the value of the tax credit increases both as income
drops and as health costs rise as a percentage of income.'
3 0
Nickles's proposal contains an ingenious technique for guarantee-
ing that most individuals will purchase basic health insurance cover-
age. His bill permits the personal exemption from Federal income tax
to be taken only by those individuals who list on their Federal tax
form the policy number of the "Federally qualified health plan" in
which they are enrolled.' 3 ' Furthermore, to augment the threat/incen-
tive, employers are mandated to take into account the employee's
health insurance status when figuring individual withholding.'32 Thus,
an uninsured employee immediately faces the effects of that choice
127. See id. § 102(b). On this point, the account differs quite sharply from the Coats
proposal, which permits contributors to exclude from income any contributions to the ac-
count, up to a defined maximum. See S. 1105 § 1(a).
128. S. 1743 § 101(a). Contributions entitled to the tax credit would be capped at some
maximum level, in order to encourage frugal consumer and employer behavior and reduce
the loss to the Federal treasury.
129. Id. § 102(a).
130. Under Senator Nickles's plan, the tax credits are refundable so that if the credit's
value is higher than the taxpayer's tax liability, the government refunds the difference. The
tax credit thus functions like the Earned Income Tax Credit. The bill specifies that the tax
credit is worth 25% of qualified health costs (insurance and unreimbursed expenses for
medical care) which do not exceed 10% of the adjusted gross income; 50% of qualified
health costs which exceed 10% but are below 20% of adjusted gross income; and 75% of
qualified health costs which exceed 20% of adjusted gross income. S. 1743 § 101(a).
131. Id. § 103(a)(1). In § 112, the bill details the minimum requirements for an insur-
ance plan to be "Federally qualified." Acute medical care, including physician, hospitaliza-
tion, and laboratory services, comprises the core requirement. Id. § 112(b). The provision
also limits deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance. Id. § 112(c). Other provisions limit
nonenrollment for preexisting conditions, id. § 114(a)(1), and guarantee renewability, id.
§ 115.
132. Id. § 121(a).
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via reduced net pay. Senator Nickles can therefore truthfully submit
that his plan does not rely on an individual or employer mandate; he
simply raises substantially the individual's cost for being uninsured.133
In addition to modifying the tax incentives and subsidies, the
Nickles plan targets many of the same arenas for reform as other
plans, sometimes reiterating the exact legislative strategy of another
bill. It includes provisions for reform of medical malpractice and
product liability laws, Medicaid and Medicare, antitrust laws relating
to the health services and health insurance industries, and long-term
care for the disabled and those with terminal illnesses.' 3 4 The bill
sidesteps other proposals' ADR jurisdictional prerequisites in favor of
more aggressive incursions both into the substantive law of malprac-
tice and product liability and into procedural matters governing these
claims, such as statutes of limitations and attorneys fees. 3
Introduced well after most of the other plans, the Nickles bill
seems to have critically assessed earlier bills' commands to State gov-
ernments and avoided some of their most problematic language. Nev-
ertheless, the bill resorts to some variants of prior problematic
provisions. States are commanded to establish a regulatory program
for certifying that health insurance plans offered in the State meet
specified Federal standards.3 6 The order is not combined with any
loss of Federal funds or other spending provision, but is backed up
with the proviso that in unqualifying States, the Secretary of HHS will
133. The plan seems predicated upon the economic model of human behavior, as ra-
tional self-maximizers, individuals will organize their conduct so to receive the tax credits
and the personal exemption-potentially several thousand dollars. Additionally, to enlist
immediate insurer and employer compliance with certain named provisions, the plan im-
poses a "tax" for noncompliance. For employers, the IRS would charge $50 per day per
employee for the failure to comply. See id. § 126(a).
134. See id. § 303 (malpractice); § 304 (product liability); §§ 201-214 (Medicare and
Medicaid); §§ 601-608 (antitrust); § 701-704 (long-term disability).
135. The bill bars strict liability recovery for medical products liability claims where the
FDA had approved the product for the market. Id. § 304(a). It also bars claims alleging
breach of the duty to warn where an appropriate warning was issued to the medical profes-
sional treating the injured patient. Id. § 304(b). In malpractice cases, the bill mandates an
offset against damages for any benefits received, for example, from a health insurance
carrier, id. § 303(c), imposes an aggressive statute of limitations, id. § 303(d), and limits
attorney's fees, id. §303(e). For both types of actions, the bill caps noneconomic damages,
id. § 305(a), and limits punitive damages, id. § 306.
136. Section 117(a) reads, "Each State shall establish no later than January 1, 1997, a
regulatory program which meets the standards [stated below]."
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assume responsibility for the activity.' 37 This proviso thus tracks the
command plus conditional preemption model.'38
The bill also commands State governments to fashion a program
for collecting and distributing comparative information regarding
health insurance plans offered in the State. Similar to the Michel
plan, the Nickles bill provides that if HHS finds the State has failed to
institute an acceptable program, HHS will do so.' 39 And H-S may
charge the State for this activity."4 Charging the State for the Federal
substitute program brings this provision within the model of com-
mand, conditional preemption, plus State fee.
One novel feature concerning States and the State purse may be
found in the Nickles bill. In order to remain eligible for "receiving
Federal funds for health care programs,' ' 141 a State must provide
health insurance coverage equal to the Federally qualified plans to all
of the residents of the State who are not insured privately. The bill
accords States four options for doing so, including coverage under the
State's Medicaid program. States are permitted to charge individuals
for the coverage premium, in light of the cost of the premium and the
individual's ability to pay.' 42 In order to be eligible for significant
grants of Federal funds under the spending power, States must insti-
tute this program consistent with Federal standards. The plan does
not supply any default mechanism in case a State does not establish
the program, but the loss of millions in Federal funds creates a situa-
tion where politically and economically a State may have no effective
ability to refuse. This approach may be termed the command plus
extraordinary inducement/penalty model.
137. Id. § 117(b).
138. The provision does not explicitly preempt States from their normal insurance regu-
latory activities, but because of the Federal tax incentives for purchasing only Federally
"qualified" insurance coverage (for example, tax credit) and the penalties (loss of personal
tax exemption) for not doing so, as a practical matter State insurance bureaus may be left
with little regulatory work. Moreover, HHS might issue an interpretive rule preempting
the State from the field of health insurance regulation.
139. S. 1743 § 422(a).
140. Id. § 422(b). The bill does not explicitly provide that fees may be assessed against
the State-in part because the provision uses passive, not active, voice. For example, the
bill provides, "Fees may be charged by the Secretary for the information provided pursuant
to a program under this sections." ld. The whole of § 422, however, appears to imply the
State will be the target of fees. From a policy standpoint, one could inquire why the fees
would not be better assessed against the insurers, as a regulatory cost of their doing busi-
ness in the State.
141. Id. § 131(a).
142. Id. § 131(c).
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4. The Single-Payer Plan (McDermott-Wellstone)
Anathema to the private insurance industry, 43 advocates of the
single-payer plan contend that market forces have failed the nation in
the health care arena and should therefore be abandoned as the mech-
anism for equitably delivering health services at a reasonable cost.
The single-payer bill is co-sponsored by ninety-one Representa-
tives.144
The rudiments of the proposed single-payer system are rather
simple and largely track the Canadian health program. 45 A standard
benefit package free of co-payments, deductibles, and all consumer
record-keeping is specified by a national board. Some State discretion
as to supplemental benefits is contemplated, generally if the State sup-
plies the additional funds for the benefit. Payments for all health serv-
ices covered under the standard package that are provided within a
geographical area, namely one State, are made by a single State gov-
ernmental agency. 146 In a sense, the whole political community self-
insures to cover the cost of delivering health services to its entire citi-
zenry. Under the McDermott-Wellstone proposal, the entire nation
self-insures via a national trust fund, whose monies would be allotted
on a State-by-State basis. All legal residents are covered under the
program.147
143. Certain other elements of the health services industry also oppose this bill.
Although the plan does not eliminate their business in toto, as it would the private health
insurance companies, many doctors and hospitals deem the bill unacceptable because it
contains provisions for the State to set the fees payable for certain services. For instance,
the McDermott-Wellstone bill permits government determination of reasonable prices for
pharmaceuticals and for dispensing services. H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 615(b),
615(c) (1993). Government price-fixing strikes fear in many. Others oppose on principle
this type of governmental control over the market. Currently, in many states, the insurers
(including the Federal government via Medicare) effectively exercise the power to set
some prices. In other states, such as Massachusetts, which bans balance billing, the power
to set compensable fees is largely shared by the State and Federal governments with the
private insurers. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 176B, § 7 (1993).
144. H.R. 1200. The October 1993 version of the bill lists 87 co-sponsors, nearly one-
quarter of the entire House. This support may be an important reason why the Clinton
Administration has preserved in its bill a State option to institute a single-payer program.
HSA § 1221.
145. For a general introduction to the Canadian single-payer system, see GAO Report
to the Chairman, House Committee on Government Operations, Canadian Health Insur-
ance: Lessons for the United States, GAO/HRD-91-90, June 4, 1991.
146. H.R. 1200 § 611. Whether consumers would still be permitted to purchase private
insurance to cover services beyond the standard benefit package is a matter still debated.
147. Id. § 102(a). A single-payer plan might distinguish between some classes of resi-
dents, such as those legally resident within the nation and those not. The McDermott-
Wellstone plan, for instance, explicitly covers "lawful resident aliens" and "certain nonim-
migrants" but not those otherwise within the country. See id. § 102.
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Adoption of a single-payer plan entails the abolition of Medicare
and Medicaid; the payroll taxes currently assessed for these programs
constitute some of the revenue to fund the new system. Significant
administrative savings for the health services sector is achieved by
mandating a single form and single system of billing codes in filings
for payment from the administrator.148 The numbers of specialized
billing personnel currently required in doctors' offices, hospitals, and
other service providers would be sharply reduced. Those savings, and
the savings that accrue from not having to pay to cover profits for the
private insurance industry, are expected to assist in funding the
streamlined single-payer system. Though the plan eliminates the need
for payment of health insurance premiums from both employers or
employees, the costs of the system would be paid by substantial addi-
tional taxes,'14 9 which has produced significant opposition to the bill.
Unlike the Clinton bill, McDermott-Wellstone would not leave to
State discretion whether to establish a single-payer system. The bill
mandates that all State governments establish a regulatory apparatus
that complies with specified Federal standards and submit a regula-
tory plan to HHS for approval.'50 The bill does not contain a Federal
default system for noncomplying States. Hence, the bill assumes all
States will comply with the regulatory mandate. Once HHS approves
the State's apparatus, the State is eligible to receive funds from the
Federal Health Security Trust Fund to pay for providers' bills for serv-
ices submitted to the State.' 5 ' The bill specifies the Federal contribu-
tion as not less than 81% nor more than 91% of the annual health
budget authorized for the State. The balance of the program is to be
paid from State funds.'
148. It is sometimes assumed that under a single-payer plan some government agency
would process and pay claims. This structure, however, is not essential to a single-payer
system and H.R. 1200 does not mandate State governments to process claims. A key alter-
native lies in the government contracting with a private entity, a health insurance firm, for
instance, to process claims and deal with the insureds. The governmental agency can retain
supervisory and policy-making power. This structure is currently used on a smaller scale
by firms that self-insure for health and medical coverage; they delegate operational author-
ity via contract to an administrative firm, normally a health insurance entity.
149. See icL §§ 811-814, 821, 831-837, 841-847, 851-852, 861-862, 871, 881, 981.
150. H.R. 1200 § 101(a) reads: "There is hereby established in the United States a
State-based American Health Security Program to be administered by the individual States
in accordance with the Federal standards specified in, or established under, this Act .. "
Section 405(a) commands the States to develop an administrative system to effectuate the
Federal program: "Each State shall submit to the [National Health] Board a plan for a
State health secretary program for providing for health care services to the residents of the
State in accordance with this Act."
151. Id. § 604.
152. Id. § 604(b).
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Not having fashioned a Federal backup apparatus in case of a
State rebuff, the co-sponsors of the plan must believe State consent is
a rather safe bet. Indeed, they appear to have included more effective
incentives to assure State participation than do most of the other re-
form plans. First, the entire national population will be taxed to pay
for the health system, so any State government that does not qualify
to receive its share of funds will likely suffer heavy political costs at
the hands of its citizenry; standing on the principle of State sover-
eignty will hardly be much of a practical defense.5 3 Second, the bill
seems to assuage State concerns about continued Federal funding of
Federal programs. Frequently in the past two decades, the Federal
government has appeared to provide States a gift horse, but later
sharply reduced Federal support, leaving to the States the financial
costs of program continuation or the political costs of the program's
elimination.'54 By contrast, the express terms of the single-payer bill
arguably create State entitlement to Federal funding at a high level.' 55
Although this Federal funding offer may seem at first blush a rou-
tine exercise of the spending power, it may raise some spending power
difficulties under current approaches. It is another example of the
model of command plus extraordinary inducement/penalty: to be eligi-
ble for Federal funds, the State must establish a regulatory program
consistent with Federal standards, and the State arguably has little ef-
fective choice but to comply.
153. See David Bryden & Daniel Farber, The Third Death of Federalism, 3 CONST.
COMM. 293 (1986) (contending that federalism is no longer a principle Congress deems
entitled to political respect when fashioning legislative programs).
154. The most recent examples may be found in President Clinton's 1995 budget, which
proposes to cut by 50% the Federal funds available for low-income heating assistance and
approximately 200 other Federal programs. See John A. Farrell & Jill Zuckman, Clinton
Budget Would Cut Deficit to a Six-year Low; $1.5 Trillion Plan Calls for Slashing 200 U.S.
Programs, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 1994, at 1. For a general discussion of the effort to
combine Federal funding programs into Federal block grants for State governments, which
provide substantially increased programmatic discretion but also substantially diminishing
Federal funds, see CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, RETHWING FEDERALISM: BLOCK GRANTS AND
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981). See also, 2 ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FIsCAL FEDERALISM:
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, 60 (1992) (providing table of Federal grant money
awarded to States and localities from 1955-1997).
155. H.R. 1200 § 604(b) provides that the National Health Board will "establish a
formula for the establishment of a Federal contribution percentage for each State," taking
into account "a State's per capita income and revenue capacity and ... other relevant
economic indicators.... The weighted-average Federal contribution percentage for all
States shall equal 86 percent and in no event shall such percentage be less than 81 percent
nor more than 91 percent."
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D. The Models Revisited
As detailed, the currently proposed health care plans present
seven types of Federal-State relations whose constitutionality under
the Tenth Amendment and spending power is potentially
problematic:' 56
I. Federal regulation of non-Federal public sector employee
benefits
II. Untethered regulatory command
III. Command plus conditional preemption
IV. Command, conditional preemption, plus State fee
V. Command, conditional preemption, plus private sector tax
VI. Private sector penalties for State nonparticipation
VII. Command plus extraordinary inducement/penalty
These health reform bills demonstrate that Congress is aggressively
seeking to expand its regulatory power over health services and deliv-
ery. And it has fashioned ingenious strategies to avoid paying many
of the regulatory costs. Whether its attempts to transfer the adminis-
trative and other financial costs to the States, or to induce compliance
from State governments, are permissible exercises of the Federal legis-
lative power pose troublesome questions. Table I summarizes the
problematic aspects of the seven pending bills. The next Part of this
Article briefly develops the current constitutional framework for eval-
uating Tenth Amendment and spending power questions and Part III
assesses the constitutionality of these seven models of problematic
Federal-State relations.
Table I
I Models
Problematic Aspects of the Seven I II II IV V VI VII
Pending Bills
Medical Savings Accounts, S. 1105
Michel, H.R. 3080
" ADR for medical malpractice X
" comparative information program X
" tax for reinsurance mechanism X
* risk management program X
" command to establish and maintain X
regulatory system
156. See supra text accompanying note 38.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Cooper, H.R. 3222
" command to enact insurance X
cooperative
" ADR for medical malpractice X
Clinton, S. 1770
" application to State and local X
employees
" State "fee" for Feds operating X
alliances
* long term care insurance penalty X
Chafee, S. 1170
" application to State and local X
employees
* command to establish regulatory X
system
" ADR for medical malpractice X
Nickles-Hatch, S. 1743
* command to establish regulatory X
program
* comparative information program X
* provide health coverage to all X
uninsured residents
Single-Payer, H.R. 1200
* command to establish regulatory X
program and monies available
H. Federal Control of State Legislative Power
From the New Deal until New York v. United States,'57 substan-
tive principles of constitutional federalism generally did not fare well
in the Supreme Court. 5 ' The Tenth Amendment began losing ground
during the New Deal, with the advent of a revised public conception
of the proper scope of Federal power.'Y9 More recently, during the
Civil Rights era, the Amendment lost further luster when southern
opponents of desegregation used it to defend "States' rights." With
Federal objectives expanding to guarantee civil rights against both
157. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991), foreshadowed
the New York shift and may also be considered to deviate from the Court's previous path.
158. The obvious but short-lived exception, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), is briefly discussed infra at text accompanying notes 165-71. Some lower
courts also took positions more respectful of federalism values. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 200-02.
159. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Grave social dislocation caused
by the Great Depression, and social acceptance of President Roosevelt's "New Deal" in-
volving new Federal political institutions to remedy the economic crisis, led to substantially
enlarged conceptions and applications of Federal legislative power. See Bruce Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1052-53 (1984).
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public and private power, 6 ' the Federal government earned the repu-
tation of being the government on the side of justice, possessing a type
of moral cum intellectual superiority. State governments and their
subdivisions appeared to be increasingly obsolete hindrances, 161 op-
posing progressive substantive ends such as those embodied in Fed-
eral civil rights, employment, and education laws. It seemed that for
most legal scholars and many in the wider public, the Federal move
toward subordinating States to Federal regulatory choices was cause
for applause. Ideas of progress and public virtue were tacitly viewed
as inherently connected with "unconditional national power"; 162 op-
position to the latter was taken as opposition to the other commit-
ments as well. During this period, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court held the Tenth Amendment to present no obstacle to the Fed-
eral government's application of the Fair Labor Standards Act 63
(FLSA) to the States. 64
National League of Cities v. Usery 61 jolted the secure view that
constitutional federalism as an affirmative limit on congressional
power had been retired. Expressly overruling precedent of only a few
years' duration, the Court held that principles of federalism barred
application of the FLSA to State and municipal employees. 66 The
opinion articulated criteria to determine when Congress had over-
stepped its Commerce Clause powers and had entered the reserved
powers of the States.' 67 Fears arose of a new Lochnerian age; judicial
intrusion, under the guise of the Tenth Amendment, into the policy
choices of Congress appeared analogous to limits once generated by
160. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one of the best examples of the Federal commit-
ment to civil rights. Separate titles created judicially enforced individual statutory rights to
be free from discrimination in employment, public education, public accommodations, and
other aspects of life. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (1988).
161. Professor Richard Briffault has suggested that States and localities, and especially
the latter, retain substantial lawmaking powers that are unlikely to be deeply affected by
the vicissitudes within Federal constitutional law such as detailed here. See Richard Brif-
fault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REv.
1 passim (1990).
162. Choper, Scope of National Power, supra note 13, at 1595.
163. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
164. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968).
165. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
166. 426 U.S. at 853-55 (overruling Wirtz). The Court's ruling might have been predi-
cated upon implied structural principles flowing from the Constitution as a whole, or it
might have been implicitly tethered to the Tenth Amendment, as the dissent presumed.
See id. at 861-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 845-46.
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"liberty of contract" principles.168 Given that the expositors of the
Court's new federalism jurisprudence also evinced limited support for
protection against discrimination and other civil rights goals,'69 their
professed solicitude for federalism appeared somewhat tainted. Few
legal scholars applauded the doctrinal turn in print; °70 the Amend-
ment's renaissance faced a largely critical academic response.17'
Between 1976 and 1985, both lower courts and the Supreme
Court attempted to refine and apply the National League of Cities cri-
teria for determining when congressional action intruded into the
States' reserved powers.'7 2 In 1985, however, the Court ruled in Gar-
cia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority"3 that the National
168. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally Daniel A. Farber,
Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MiNN. L. REv. 1331, 1355 (1988); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 877 (1987); Christopher T. Wonnell, Eco-
nomic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11 HASTNGS CONsT. L.Q. 91
(1983).
169. This close association tarred federalism, suggesting it was merely a shield for op-
pressive State action rather than a constitutional concept and structure having independent
normative value.
170. Professors Robert Nagel and Kathryn Abrams praised aspects of National League
of Cities and the general thrust of reviving judicially enforceable federalism norms. See
Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspec-
tive, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 81; Kathryn Abrams, Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth
Amendment, 93 YALE L.J 723 (1984) [hereinafter Abrams Note].
171. See, e.g., Choper, Scope of National Power, supra note 13; Martha A. Field, supra
note 13; Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Re-
view: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1987). Two scholars suggested
that National League of Cities foreshadowed the recognition of new substantive constitu-
tional rights for individuals. Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HAnv. L.
RBv. 1065 (1977); Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of
"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
172. As later summarized, the inquiry involved a four-part test:
First,... the Federal statute at issue must regulate "the 'states as states."'
Second, the statute "must address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of
state sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the Federal obligation must "di-
rectly impair [the States'] ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions."' Finally, the relation of state and federal
interests must not be such that "the nature of the federal interest ... justifies state
submission."
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 540 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 287-88 n.29 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, 852)).
See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982). For reference to the numerous lower courts which struggled to apply the enun-
ciated criteria, see Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39 (citing cases).
173. 469 U.S. 540 (1985).
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League of Cities criteria were unworkable 74 and not faithful to the
national political process, to which, the Court concluded, the Consti-
tution had committed the preservation of federalism. 75 Then-Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, writing in separate dissents, pre-
dicted the Court would revisit its conclusion that the Tenth Amend-
ment was nonjusticiable. 76
Indeed it did. In New York v. United States, 77 the Court revived
the Tenth Amendment's justiciability. With the security of a 6-3 ma-
jority, the opinion bolstered the principles of constitutional federalism
reflected in the Tenth Amendment. Because of the Court's emphasis
on unconstitutional coercion of the States, the decision also intimated
that historic spending power restrictions, thus far merely hortatory,
may be given serious weight.
New York's significance is greatest where a Federal enactment at-
tempts to command certain State legislative or administrative activity
to achieve Federal regulatory goals. A justiciable Tenth Amendment
claim will be available in such circumstances. New York, however,
plows no new ground under the spending power. At most, it signals
solicitude for federalism values, which may be impaired by particular
exercises of the spending power. The New York Court moved away
from Garcia,'78 limiting its import in two respects.
A. Background to New York: The Public Policy Problem of Low-
Level Radioactive Waste
By the end of 1985, when Congress enacted the Low-Level Radi-
oactive Waste Policy Amendments Act (LLRWPA), 179 only three
states, South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada, had facilities actively
receiving low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) for disposal.' 80 The
174. The decision centered on the difficulty of applying the criterion regarding a State's
"traditional governmental functions." Id. at 538.
175. See id. at 547-54. In concluding that federalism embraced a set of policy decisions
committed to Congress and protected by "procedural safeguards inherent in the structure
of the Federal system," id. at 552, the Court relied principally on the work of Professors
Jesse Choper and Herbert Wechsler. See, e.g., id. at 551 n.11, 554 n.18 (citing JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRocEss (1980); Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954)).
176. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
177. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
178. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-j (1988).
180. Unless otherwise stated, the description of the facts in New York is taken from the
Court's decision. See 112 S. Ct. at 2414-17. Congress has classified waste according to its
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balance of the nation was shipping its waste into these states. Officials
in the burdened States considered it unfair for their States alone to be
the repositories of the nation's LLRW,181 with the collateral burdens
imposed by shipping these wastes through the "sited States.""lm An
earlier Federal effort to promote voluntary regional compacts be-
tween States had, five years later, produced little movement toward
construction of new waste facilities. 8 '
The LLRWPA ensued, with three types of incentives designed to
guarantee that all State governments assumed responsibility for dispo-
sal of the LLRW generated within their borders.' 84 First, the Act au-
thorized the sited States to collect a series of surcharges, graduated
over time, on waste shipped to their States. 85 One-quarter of the
surcharges were to be held by the Secretary of Energy in an escrow
account. The Act directed the Secretary to make incentive payments
to a State for each of the five statutory milestones it satisfied in its
effort to create or obtain other disposal options. These payments
were designed to help offset the significant costs of conducting the
siting activities. The Act further mandated that any State which failed
to meet a specified deadline must either take title to the waste gener-
level of radioactivity. Classes A, B, and C are considered "low-level." The Federal gov-
ernment has assumed responsibility for disposing of radioactive waste with levels higher
than C. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(b)(1)(D) (1988, Supp. 1990).
181. See Brief for Respondent, New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (Nos.
91-543, 91-558, 90-563).
182. The Supreme Court uses the term "sited State" to designate those States which
maintain within their borders a certified disposal site for LLRW that is operational and
able to accept LLRW for storage. See New York, 112 S. Ct at 2415-16.
183. In 1980, Congress enacted the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L.
96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, which authorized the establishment of State compacts for disposal of
low level radioactive waste, but provided no penalties for nonparticipation. In 1985, one
year before the Act would have allowed States in such compacts to exclude waste from
other States, only three compacts had been formed, all of which were centered around
States already containing low level radioactive waste disposal sites. See New York, 112 S.
Ct. at 2414-15.
184. Two of these incentives-those New York ruled constitutional-were largely fash-
ioned upon a proposal from the National Governors' Association. The one held unconsti-
tutional, the "take-title" provision, owed its legislative genesis to a "Dear Colleague" letter
circulated by Senator Thurmond of South Carolina. See 131 CONG. REc. S18,105-06 (daily
ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (statement of Senator Thurmond). Senators Thurmond and Johnston
introduced the take-title provision as an amendment to the pending LLRWPA bill during
the hurried last hours of the legislative session, on December 19, 1985. That same day,
both Houses voted to enact the LLRWPA. See id.
185. Normally States are prohibited from discriminating against commerce originating
from sister States. But in this instance, Congress employed its Commerce Clause powers
to encourage that discrimination, in order to raise the incentives for unsited States to con-
duct the specified regulatory activities.
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ated within its borders or forfeit to the waste generators (who gener-
ally had paid the surcharges) the incentive payments it had received.
The second set of statutory incentives primarily concerned access
to the existing three LLRW facilities and additional monetary incen-
tives. Repository States were permitted to charge generators of
LLRW located in noncompliant States twice the ordinary surcharge
and to bar access to the repository thereafter. Noncompliance with a
later deadline (imposing additional regulatory responsibilities) could
produce, at the sited recipient State's option, double surcharges for
the first half of the year, quadruple surcharges for the second half of
the year, and no access thereafter. States which completed all the reg-
ulatory responsibilities imposed by earlier dates, but which did not
meet the January 1992 date for filing a complete application to oper-
ate a LLRW disposal facility, and States which belonged to compacts
that did not file a complete application by that date, were subject to
triple surcharges on the LLRW waste generated within their borders.
The final inducement for States to comply with the Federal Act
involved a different type of incentive. If, by January 1996, a State was
not able "to provide for the disposal of all" LLRW generated within
its borders,
upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, [the
State] shall take title to the waste, be obligated to take posses-
sion of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or
indirectly incurred by such generator or owner [by the State's
refusal] to take possession ....
Unlike other Federal statutes, this provision did not give the States an
opportunity to exit the regulatory field and relinquish responsibility to
the Federal government with no penalty other than the loss of State
power over the issue.187 Many States perceived the two options ac-
corded the States here-to take title to the waste or be liable for dam-
ages-as no choice at all.
While the "unsited" States acknowledged the burden on the three
States which were shouldering the waste burden for the nation, they
generally disputed that each State should bear the financial responsi-
bility for the waste generated within its borders. For instance, the Act
mandated that States take responsibility for LLRW generated within
its borders by Federal government sources as well as by private indus-
186. LLRWPA § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
187. The New York Court described this quality of the provision as unique. New York,
112 S. Ct. at 2429.
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try.1 88 Connecticut's situation demonstrates some of the larger objec-
tions.189 In Connecticut, over 99% of the annual amount of LLRW is
generated by privately owned nuclear power plants, which are regu-
lated by the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and whose elec-
tricity is sold over interstate grids regulated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. States were forbidden to regulate the pro-
duction of radioactive waste from these private sources, even in the
interest of reducing it.190 Having been preempted from that aspect of
the regulatory field, the LLRWPA's imposition of long-term responsi-
bility for the hazardous waste products of private industry-a signifi-
cant liability-struck the State as particularly unfair.'9 ' The Act
permitted Congress to claim credit for solving the nation's LLRW cri-
sis, without shouldering any of the political or financial costs. Con-
necticut asserted that the citizen protests that followed would be (and
were) directed at the State government-not at the Federal govern-
ment-for the latter's mandate that States engage in the publicly con-
demned regulatory activity of siting a nuclear dump. With an
enormous and increasing Federal budget deficit, State officials addi-
tionally perceived in the LLRWPA a menacing precedent for future
Federal legislation.
B. State Reliance on Hodel and FERC
The States contesting the constitutionality of the statute at issue
in New York relied heavily on two cases decided between National
League of Cities and Garcia. In both Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Association'92 and Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission v. Mississippi,93 the challenged statutes arguably commanded
State governments to implement a Federal regulatory scheme. In
188. LLRWPA § 2021c(a)(1)(B). The Court's opinions in New York never mention this
point.
.189. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of Connecticut, Statement of Interest, New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (Nos. 91-543, 91-558, 91-563) [hereinafter
"Connecticut Brief'].
190. Reduction of hazardous waste is a primary goal of major environmental organiza-
tions. Radioactive waste poses special hazards, for its radioactivity can persist for at least
500 years. See Dan M. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" States' Sovereignty in
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARV. ENVmL. L.
REv. 437 (1987).
191. Connecticut submitted it had already paid $6.2 million in costs incurred in comply-
ing with the LLRWPA. See Connecticut Brief, supra note 189, at Statement of Interest.
The State did not note how much it received back in surcharge rebates for compliance with
all the specified timetables.
192. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
193. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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neither case were the putatively offending statutes applicable to both
private and public actors; they singled out State governments for spe-
cial responsibilities. Although the State challengers did not succeed in
either case, the decisions did provide some recognition that the Tenth
Amendment restricted Congress' power to issue direct orders to
States pursuant to the commerce power.
A trade association initiated the Hodel litigation' 94 to restrain the
Federal Surface Mining Act's imposition of significant new costs on
"steep-slope" strip mining. The Act required mining companies to re-
turn their sites to "approximate original contour"'195 and not to dump
refuse material in downslope gullies,196 requirements some companies
found prohibitively expensive. Plaintiffs contended the regiflatory
system violated numerous constitutional provisions, including the
Tenth Amendment as interpreted and applied by National League of
Cities. The Court was not persuaded, noting that the Act's affirmative
obligations fell exclusively on private actors, well within the com-
merce power. 97
With regard to the provisions addressed to States alone, the
Court had no difficulty concluding the Federal act was a prototypical
conditional preemption statute. It did not compel a State to regulate
surface mining but if a State chose to do so (or wanted to continue
that activity), the Act mandated the State to conduct its regulatory
program in a manner consistent with minimum Federal standards. If
it did not, it would be preempted from the field, relinquishing surface
mining regulation to an agency of the Federal government. The Court
specifically ruled that the threat of preemption, even in an arena tradi-
tionally entrusted to the States under their police powers, did not of-
fend the Tenth Amendment.198
Hodel may have initially appeared to undermine States' interests
in reinvigorating the Tenth Amendment because it upheld conditional
preemption even under the newer, stricter standards of National
League of Cities. But in assessing whether the Federal regulatory
scheme was constitutionally permissible, the Court emphasized that
the statute did not "commandeer[ ] the legislative processes of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a Federal reg-
ulatory program."' 99 The Court contrasted the Surface Mining Act
194. Virginia later intervened. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 273.
195. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265(d)(1)-(d)(3) (1988).
196. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)(1) (1988); see Hodel, 452 U.S. at 273.
197. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289-93.
198. Id. at 289-91.
199. Id. at 288 (citations omitted).
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with the regulations the Environmental Protection Agency had
promulgated to enforce the Clean Air Act,200 which three circuits had
ruled unconstitutional intrusions into the reserved powers of the
States.2  The circuits had held that the nation's commerce power did
not extend so far as to permit the EPA to compel States to implement
and enforce a Federal regulatory program.202
In the Term immediately following Hodel, the Court faced a more
difficult case regarding the reach of the commerce power into State
government. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississipp2 °3
tested the constitutionality of a Federal regulatory program arguably
far closer to the line the circuits held to have been crossed by the
EPA. °  Portions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988).
201. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288-89 (citing EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Maryland
v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224-28 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom.; District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 990-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom.).
202. The regulations at issue imposed affirmative obligations upon several States to
adopt vehicle inspection and maintenance programs and to require the retrofit of certain
classes of vehicles with pollution control devices. The following language from the D.C.
Circuit decision in Train is representative of the courts' holdings:
[T]he [EPA] Administrator, in the exercise of federal power based solely on
the commerce clause, cannot against a State's wishes compel it to become in-
volved in administering the details of the regulatory scheme promulgated by the
Administrator. For example, the attempt to require the state to "establish" ...
retrofit programs... is an impermissible encroachment on state sovereignty and
goes beyond "regulation" by the Congress. It seeks, under the guise of the com-
merce power, to substitute compelled state regulation for permissible federal reg-
ulation. If the federal government wants to impose a program under federal
authority, it is limited by the restrictions applicable thereto....
In essence, the Administrator is here attempting to commandeer the regulatory
powers of the states, along with their personnel and resources, for use in administer-
ing and enforcing a federal regulatory program against the owners of motor vehi-
cles. . . . Under the regulations here, the states are to function merely as
departments of the EPA, following EPA guidelines and subject to federal penal-
ties if they refuse to comply or if their regulation of vehicles is ineffective. We are
aware of no decisions of the Supreme Court which hold that the Federal govern-
ment may validly exercise its commerce power by directing unconsenting states to
regulate activities affecting interstate commerce, and we doubt that any exist.
Train, 521 F.2d at 992 (emphasis added).
When these three cases reached the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General under-
scored the constitutional limitation. In his brief on behalf of the Federal parties he dis-
avowed "any power to compel the State to carry out its governmental responsibilities" as
by "direct[ing] the State to adopt laws and regulations ... that comply with" federal law.
With this Federal concession, the Court held it had little choice other than to dismiss the
appeal. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 104 (1977) (vacating the judgment and remanding for
consideration of mootness).
203. 456 U.S. 741 (1982).
204. See supra note 201.
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197811 required State utility commissions to consider whether to
adopt and enforce under State law a dozen separate and highly de-
tailed Federal standards. It also minutely prescribed various proce-
dural requirements that the State agency was to follow in any
proceeding relating either to these standards or to electric utility rates
generally. The Court found none of the mandates offensive to the
Tenth Amendment because the State was free to relinquish the regu-
latory field rather than regulate according to congressional directives.
Having fit the challenged act within the conditional preemption
model, the conclusion of constitutionality easily followed.2 °6
Justice O'Connor, however, was not persuaded by the Court's
reasoning. Joined by two others, she advanced propositions foreshad-
owing the approach of her majority opinion in New York. She
contended:
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of
the national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks to which
Congress may assign problems for extended study. Instead,
each State is sovereign within its own domain, governing its citi-
zens and providing for their general welfare. While the Consti-
tution and Federal statutes define the boundaries of that
domain, they do not harness State power for national
purposes. °7
Plainly, Justice O'Connor would have enunciated a bright-line rule to
govern this and future cases: the Tenth Amendment bars the Federal
government from issuing orders to State governments that require
them to enact or implement Federal law. 0 s She urged that the State
governments' formal ability to exit the regulatory field rather than
205. Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at various parts of the United States Code).
The State of Mississippi challenged the constitutionality of the Act under both the Tenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. All Justices agreed that the Act presented no
Commerce Clause problems. FERC, 456 U.S. at 753-58.
206. FERC, 456 U.S. at 758-71.
207. FERC, 456 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Though more vigorously rhetor-
ical, the dissent generally restates the Train court's view. See supra note 202. Ultimately,
Justice O'Connor argued that the Act at issue in FERC violated each of the criteria of the
National League of Cities-Hodel framework. FERC, 456 U.S. at 781 n.8.
208. The FERC majority cited Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), as authority for the
Federal government's power to issue binding orders to State governments. The majority
generalized from the legitimacy in Testa of enlisting the State judiciary to serve national
goals (through enforcing Federal law) to the broader principle that the Federal govern-
ment can require such service from any branch of State government. FERC, 456 U.S. at
762-63. While Justice O'Connor responded to the majority's citation of Testa, see FERC,
456 U.S. at 784-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), she failed to recognize any distinctions be-
tween the Constitution's treatment of different branches of State government. It is true
that, owing to the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution does directly attempt to "harness"
the power of one branch of State government-the judiciary-in service of national objec-
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comply with the Federal mandate did not cure the predicate constitu-
tional violation when the option to exit was in fact largely illusory." 9
Though this latter point was not adopted in New York, the Court did
approve the bright-line rule Justice O'Connor fashioned over one dec-
ade ago.
C. New York's Import
The holding in New York validated the States' argument that the
Federal government's reach had exceeded its constitutional authority.
Moreover, it revived the justiciability of the Tenth Amendment, thus
permitting the courts to forestall such Federal excesses. No longer
could the courts view the Federal commerce power as virtually limit-
less; one constraint was now recognized and enforceable.
The statute at issue, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act,
included a broad and unambiguous regulatory directive to State gov-
ernments: "Each State shall be responsible for providing.., for the
disposal of... low-level radioactive waste."21 The State of New York
contended that the statute as a whole was a Federal command for the
States to undertake regulatory responsibility for a particular matter in
a particular way. The Court ducked this facial constitutional attack
and construed the statute in a manner that permitted it to avoid strik-
ing down the statute as a whole.211
tives. But there is no basis for generalizing from one branch to all, especially in light of
larger federalism values.
209. FERC, 465 U.S. at 781-84. Even the majority agreed that in the instant case "it
may be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of public utilities to
avoid [the Act's] requirements." Id. at 767. Justice O'Connor did not clarify whether the
realistic availability of exit from a regulatory field might change her analysis; such an op-
tion was, in any event, not present in the Act.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A); see also New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425.
211. The asserted basis for its approach lay in the settled interpretive rule directing
courts faced with two plausible readings of a statute, one constitutional and one arguably
not, to interpret the statute in a manner designed to avoid deciding the constitutional ques-
tion. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425 (citing Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S.
Ct. 2395, 2403 (1991) (invoking plain statement rule to avoid constitutional question).
Although hard evidence is lacking, there are intimations in Justice O'Connor's discussion
that she may have been sympathetic to the State of New York's claim that the statute as a
whole was ultimately not a set of incentives from Congress to the States but in fact a direct
command. Perhaps especially telling in the statute is the absence of any default mecha-
nism to acheive Federal control of low-level radioactive waste disposal where States failed
to comply. No such default is necessary where the penalties prescribed leave the States
virtually no option but to comply. It may be that the Court decided to invoke the pruden-
tial interpretive rule and not hold the entire statute unconstitutional so that it could ap-
prove at least part of the LLRWPA and thus not cripple the interstate effort to resolve the
LLRW problem. To reach this policy objective, however, the Court may have had to side-
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Nevertheless, the New York Court unequivocally announced that
the power to regulate commerce does not confer upon Congress the
power to issue direct orders to the States to employ their regulatory
powers in service of Federal goals.212 The opinion pervasively under-
scored this point, mentioning some version of it a dozen times.213 Ap-
plying this principle, the Court ruled that the take-title provision was
unconstitutional. By characterizing the other two provisions as ac-
cording States the option of participating in the Federal program, but
not compelling them to do so, the Court concluded that these provi-
sions were properly analyzed under the spending power.2 4
1. Justiciable Claims
What, then, conduces to raise a justiciable Tenth Amendment
claim? One type of claim arises from a Federal legislative command
that States employ their legislative or executive branches in a manner
designed to facilitate Federal regulatory objectives. The other type of
Tenth Amendment issue arises when any Federal regulatory program
step the mandatory nature of the major statutory phrase requiring "[e]ach State [to be]
responsible for providing... for the disposal of... low-level radioactive waste." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021c(a)(1)(A).
212. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428. The import of this proposition for cases such as
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1992), is unclear but will undoubtedly be faced
in coming years.
213. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420 ("Congress may not simply 'commandeer[ ] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a fed-
eral regulatory program."') (citation omitted); id. (noting that "'this Court never has sanc-
tioned -explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and
regulations"') (citation omitted); id. at 2421 (distinguishing a prior case, where "'[t]here
[wa]s nothing in [the statute at issue] "directly compelling" the States to enact a legislative
program') (citation omitted); id. ("[T]he Constitution has never been understood to con-
fer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' in-
structions.") (citations omitted); id. at 2423 ("Even where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.") (citations omitted); id.
("Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Con-
gress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests.");
id. at 2428 (holding unconstitutional "federal action [that] would 'commandeer' state gov-
ernments into the service of federal regulatory purposes"); id. (noting the unconstitutional-
ity of statutes that "present a simple command to state governments to implement
legislation enacted by Congress"); id. (noting the unconstitutionality of a statute that
"'commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program") (citation omitted); id. at 2429 ("[T]he Constitu-
tion simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate .... "); id.
at 2430-31 ([T]he Framers did not intend that Congress should exercise [the commerce]
power through the mechanism of mandating state regulation . . . ."); id. at 2435 ("The
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a Federal regula-
tory program.")
214. See infra notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
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compels State government involvement by offering to the State an
ephemeral choice between two options: either pursue the federally de-
sired involvement, or undertake an alternate activity that Congress is
not constitutionally empowered to compel of the States. These tech-
niques, the Court instructed, have the effect of conscripting State gov-
ernments' resources for national purposes and subordinating them to
national objectives. The Court feared that unless halted, Congress
would convert the States into mere bureaucratic offices for the na-
tional government, and strip them of the ability to be effective repub-
lican governments in their own right.215 This republican role of the
States, in service both to their constituencies and to the nation, which
depends on their efficacy in this role,1 6 constitutes part of the core
values and activities protected by the Tenth Amendment. The New
York Court also pointed to the promotion of political accountability as
a constitutionally cognizable value, fostered by the Tenth Amendment
principle and safeguarded by its justiciability." 7
For a justiciable Tenth Amendment claim to arise, a State must
be presented with either (1) a direct Federal order compelling it to
engage in regulatory activity that is beyond Congress' Article I enu-
merated powers to issue and that is not an otherwise permissible in-
centive to regulate in accordance with congressional objectives,218 or
(2) a set of regulatory options from which States are ordered to
choose at least one, where all options are beyond the enumerated
powers of Congress to compel through a direct order to a State.2 9
Presenting States with a "choice between two unconstitutionally coer-
cive regulatory techniques is no choice at all."'220
2. Permissible Incentives
What are the otherwise permissible "incentives" to regulate in ac-
cordance with Federally defined objectives? This question requires
assessment of the boundaries of the spending power 21 The Court
has long held that the scope of subjects for which Congress can appro-
priate money is not delimited by its enumerated powers.222 New York
215. See supra note 213.
216. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2421,2431; see also Andrej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty
to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Cr. REv. 341, 380-414.
217. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432.
218. See id. at 2425, 2428-29.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2428.
221. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
222. See, e.g., U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,640-41
(1937). See generally Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988);
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did not disturb this point. Inquiring into the conditional grant pro-
gram's permissibility,2" the New York Court did not traverse any new
ground, but simply rehearsed the summation of principles presented
in South Dakota v. Dole.2 4 As in Dole, the New York Court under-
scored the deferential nature of the inquiry and stated four independ-
ent requirements for validating a congressional spending program: (1)
it must be in pursuit of the general welfare; (2) it must unambiguously
state any conditions governing the States' receipt of funds; (3) its con-
ditions, if any, should be related to the Federal interest in particular
national projects or programs; and (4) its conditions must not trans-
gress any independent constitutional bar. 2
The primary reason that New York did not generate further gloss
on this inquiry is attributable to its plaintiffs, who did not question the
Dole requirements for a valid conditional Federal grant.z 6 Rather,
they raised the esoteric question whether the release of trust funds
held in escrow for the States pursuant to an act of Congress could
properly be evaluated as a conditional grant under the spending
power 227 The Court's cursory answer to the States' query may have
been justified, but it leaves untouched certain questions about the
outer reaches of the spending power authorization to provide condi-
tional grants to states.228
3. Limiting Garcia
Thus, while remaining relatively sterile regarding the outer limits
of the spending power, New York generates important new Tenth
Amendment principles which seem to undermine Garcia. Two dis-
tinct principles of Garcia and its offspring, South Carolina v. Baker,229
have been circumscribed. First, the supposed nonjusticiability of the
Tenth Amendment has been qualified: where a State seeks to question
a direct order from the Federal government to use its purse or person-
nel in a Federally defined manner to serve Federal regulatory goals, a
Kaden, supra note 6; Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 112-13; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
93, § 5.7.
223. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-26.
224. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
225. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2426 (citations and quotations omitted).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. These questions are explored in Part III, infra.
229. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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justiciable Tenth Amendment claim will be stated." ° Importantly,
however, other conceivable types of Tenth Amendment claims are not
necessarily rendered justiciable by this ruling. The Court's second
limitation of Garcia underscores this point. Congressional enactments
ordering affirmative State conduct can be bifurcated. Those that at-
tempt "to subject State governments to generally applicable laws" 31
apparently will continue to be governed by Garcia principles, perhaps
even as to justiciability. Only the other type of enactment, Federal
acts which seek to subject States to orders not having general applica-
bility to other entities and individuals, are addressed by New York. 32
The continuing vitality of this bifurcation is a necessary condition if
State government employees are permissibly covered by the provi-
sions of the national health reform proposals.
D. New York's Deficiencies
With the New York Court's ruling in view, we now have the basis
for assessing its implications for the pending health care proposals in
Congress. Before turning to that subject in Part III, however, a few
additional words on the New York opinion are necessary. The deci-
sion in New York has been greeted with such significant criticism that
arguments based on New York may not have a stable foundation. 33
The facile response is that New York is now the law, and the health
reform proposals should be alert to that fact. The constitutional
framework established by New York is, of course, the basis for the
evaluation in Part III of the various health reform plans.
This rejoinder is insufficient, though, because, were the issue
presented, the Court might re-examine New York in the context of a
challenged health reform program.234 A more sophisticated defense
230. This outcome should satisfy in part the concerns stated by scholars including Wil-
liam Van Alstyne, Martin Redish and Robert Nagel. See Van Alstyne, supra note 13; Red-
ish & Drizin, supra note 171; Nagel, supra note 170.
231. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420.
232. As noted earlier, see supra note 20, this principle is ironic. The more the Federal
government treats States as if they were indistinguishable from private commercial entities
rather than having a distinct constitutional status, the more likely the Federal law will be
held a valid exercise of Federal power.
233. See Jesse H. Choper, Federalism and Judicial Review: An Update, 21 HASTNGs
CONST. L.Q. 577 (1994); Martin H. Redish, Doing it with Mirrors: New York v. United
States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21
HASTWGS CONST. L.Q. 593 (1994); Richard Briffault, Federalism and Health Care Reform:
Is Half a Loaf Really Worse Than None?, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611 (1994).
234. This is unlikely to occur in the near future, because the only Justices to announce
their retirement since New York was issued, Justices Blackmun and White, dissented in
pertinent part from the 6-3 decision.
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of New York should cover two bases: the merits of the substantive
conclusion and the means by which the Court reached it. Because this
Article is primarily dedicated to evaluating the constitutionality of the
health reform plans, an extended justification here would distract
from larger goals. This Article does suggest, however, that while the
Court's substantive result is correct, its analysis in New York is errant.
This Part identifies a few core methodological deficiencies in the
Court's opinion and suggests why alternative approaches nevertheless
permit one to join in the Court's conclusion.
1. Underlying Problems
The most glaring problem lies in the opinion's substitution of rep-
etitious assertions for reasoned legal argument. For instance, the
opinion restates some version of its central principle, that the Federal
government's power does not extend to compelling States to imple-
ment Federal regulatory programs, a dozen times?3 5 Yet even for
someone persuaded that the conclusion is constitutionally correct, the
opinion is woefully thin in reasoning. The opinion bypasses an oppor-
tunity to present a powerful refortification of federalism.
If well-reasoned arguments were available,-and Justice
O'Connor has shown herself easily capable of crafting them-what
explains the neglect? The answer probably lies in the disparate juris-
prudential commitments of the Justices. It is difficult, for instance, to
explain why Justice O'Connor would expend considerable effort in
Gregory v. Ashcrofp16 to outline a functional justification for federal-
ism only to reject such arguments as inherently unsound and beside
the point one year later.37 Thus, the opinion fails to present persua-
sive reasons why, 200 years later, we should still recognize some type
235. See supra note 213 (quoting all versions of its principle). Often the reasoning ap-
pears circular; the holding is justified in terms that largely paraphrase the holding. See,
e.g., id.
236. 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2404-05 (1991).
237. In New York, O'Connor wrote:
The benefits of this Federal structure have been extensively catalogued elsewhere
... but they need not concern us here. Our task would be the same even if one
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of
our devising our preferred system of government, but of understanding and ap-
plying the framework set forth in the Constitution.
New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2418 (citations omitted). This language might have been urged by
another Justice, such as Justice Scalia, as a condition of joining the opinion.
The Court did rely on originalist justifications, writing that the Founders never in-
tended the Federal government to issue orders directly to State governments requiring
them to use their legislative powers to achieve Federal ends. Id. at 2418-19. This argument
is reminiscent of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), where the Court wrote that the very
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of federalism as constitutional.13s That omission may unfortunately
require the Court to intercede repeatedly on policy matters as critical
as health reform. Had the Court properly utilized the opportunity
presented by New York, it might have persuaded Members of Con-
gress to avoid attempts to assimilate the budgets, personnel, and polit-
ical agenda-setting of the State governments. Certainly, few pending
health reform bills evidence a view of the States as potential partners
to be enticed into a joint effort; they instead reflect a union more akin
to a shotgun wedding.
2. The "Mirror Image" Fallacy
The New York opinion also handles precedent poorly. The signal
example lies in the purported "mirror image" theory of Commerce
Clause and Tenth Amendment interaction. The doctrinal approach to
this interaction had been settled since Darby v. United States.39
Given that the Tenth Amendment is a residuary clause,240 the Court's
practice was to assess whether the disputed Federal statute fell within
idea that Congress could issue such orders was sufficiently foreign to the understanding of
the day that, were the power intended, it would have been specified plainly. Id. at 18-19.
The Court could have adduced additional historical support for its holding in the
records of the Constitutional Convention, where a congressional veto over State laws was
discussed and rejected several times in favor of the Supremacy Clause. See S. Candice
Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause,
24 CoNN. L. REv. 829, 861-74 (1992). The power to veto State law is neither as broad or
intrusive to State governments as the ability to issue affirmative orders to their legislatures
or executives; the former is reactive, the latter proactive and potentially possessory.
The Court underscored its originalist and textual arguments with an empirical point.
The historical constitutional tradition has never suggested that Congress possessed the
challenged power. Indeed, the Court found that the little existing authority on the ques-
tion directly supported its conclusion. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2421 (citing Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (ruling Congress lacked the power to force a State to move its
State capital as a condition of statehood)).
Even being faithful to its own originalism, the Court should have acknowledged the
lack of definitive historical and textual support for its conclusion. Because the Court was
answering a question of first impression, one on which the Constitution's text speaks am-
biguously at best, the historical and textual arguments the Court advanced only confirm
what we already know: that there is some evidence-not necessarily conclusive-to sup-
port the Court's view.
238. Sometimes the Court asserts a connection between some recognized constitutional
value and federalism without arguing for their interrelation. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at
2422-23, 2431 (asserting that federalism was designed to secure the peoples' liberties and
the republic itself).
239. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
240. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CoNST. amend. X.
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the scope of a delegated power.241 The Court then analyzed the ques-
tion as merely a Commerce Clause challenge; no special criteria ap-
plied simply because federalism values-whether implied from
general constitutional structure or embedded in the Tenth Amend-
ment-were implicated. If a Federal act were a valid exercise of the
commerce power, the Tenth Amendment inquiry ended concurrently.
As a residuary provision, the Amendment protected as powers re-
served to States and individuals all those not delegated to the nation;
nothing further was left to adjudicate as a matter of the Tenth
Amendment.
In New York, however, Justice O'Connor modified this inquiry in
a subtle but critical manner. She contended that, in cases adjudicating
"the division of authority between Federal and State governments," it
matters not whether the Court inquires "whether an Act of Congress
is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I"
or "whether an Act of Congress invades the province of State sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment."' 42 According to the
Court, the two inquiries "are mirror images of each other": "If a
power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amend-
ment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the states; if
a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not con-
ferred on Congress."'' 43
Having laid this foundation, the Court next determined that the
Tenth Amendment, like the First and Fifth Amendments, subjects
even the expressly delegated powers of Congress to certain con-
straints. Thus, it frames the inquiry as "whether an incident of State
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power. '
Given that the Tenth Amendment is expressly structured as a residu-
ary clause, it is at least curious that the Court should be deciding what
affirmative content is contained within the Amendment and then em-
ploying that conception to limit Congress' commerce power.
Through the use of its "mirror image" theory, the Court both
turned the inquiry on its head and obscured the import of its move.
The Tenth Amendment by its terms reserves to the States only those
powers that have not been granted to the nation. It seems beyond
241. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
242. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417.
243. Id. (citations omitted).
244. Id. at 2418.
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cavil that the first step in the inquiry, if proceeding textually, is to
ascertain whether the Federal act falls within a delegated power. But
the Court represented that the inquiry can proceed from either direc-
tion without in any way affecting the conclusion. The Court thus im-
plicitly denied that it has transformed the analysis. Yet the effect was
to reconstruct the Tenth Amendment to embrace and enforce a judi-
cially created content that placed affirmative limits on national pow-
ers, including those expressly delegated.245
3. Alternatives
To revive federalism as a fundamental constitutional structure
with operative, judicially enforceable content, the Court might have
selected one of at least two alternative approaches. Under one, the
Court could have undertaken a Commerce Clause analysis and ap-
plied time-honored principles in a new manner. The Court still could
have stricken the take-title provision without appearing to violate the
residuary approach embedded in the Tenth Amendment. Under the
other, the Court could have derived its holding from implied struc-
tural principles of federalism. Both routes have their difficulties,246
but are not as vulnerable to criticism as that chosen by the Court.
a. Commerce Clause
Chief Justice Marshall originally provided the broad and often
quoted standard for determining the validity of an exercise of the
commerce power in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper
Clause: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
[C]onstitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the let-
ter and spirit of the [C]onstitution, are constitutional."'247 A century
later, in another case concerning the interaction of the Tenth Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause, the Court summarized national
power as embracing "all means for the exercise of a granted power
which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.", 4
245. As apparent from his article in this issue, see Redish, supra note 233, both the
inversion of the Amendment's text and the ultimate impact on delegated national powers
troubles insightful textualists such as Professor Redish.
246. Because the ultimate purpose of this Article is to assess the implications of the
Court's new federalism jurisprudence for national health reform, presentation and assess-
ment of the Court's approach are perforce abbreviated. For a more sustained evaluation of
the deficiencies in New York, see the responsive commentaries by Professors Choper, Red-
ish and Briffault supra note 233.
247. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).
248. Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941) (emphasis supplied).
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The interpretive pressure point lies in determining what are "appro-
priate" means.
In exercising this limitation, the Court need not have stated the
range of means Congress may have employed. It only needed to de-
marcate what lies beyond the constitutional boundary via careful ex-
plication of "the letter and spirit of the Constitution." The New York
opinion offered several salient points here. The commerce power au-
thorizes Congress to regulate commerce; it does not authorize or con-
template national power compelling State governments to regulate
commerce according to nationally prescribed norms. Thus, Federal
laws that seek, "under the guise of the commerce power, to substitute
compelled State regulation for permissible Federal regulation" 249 are
not employing appropriate means. Such means are outside both the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, with reference to the purposes of
federalism and the promise of republican State governments. °50 The
opinion's concerns for effective representation and political accounta-
bility at both State and national levels could have been more
powerfully developed and presented as constitutional values that jus-
tify ruling this small set of congressional strategies unconstitutional.
Congress could have regulated, and even barred, the generation of
any new LLRW-an article in commerce-under the commerce
power;z2' it could have built national disposal facilities, created certain
incentives for States to undertake regulatory programs consistent with
Federal goals, or undertaken many other strategies. But the means
available for regulating commerce have limits imposed by other as-
pects of the Constitution, limits that were exceeded by the take-title
provision.
b. Structural Federalism
In addition to the Commerce Clause alternative, the Court could
have further developed the functional requirements of the structural
federalism implied in the Constitution as a whole, which it began elab-
orating in Gregory. 2 The Court's authority to protect the Constitu-
tion properly includes the defense not only of individual rights as
249. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971,992 (1975). The opinion continued: "If
the Federal government wants to impose a program under Federal authority [to regulate
commerce], it is limited by the restrictions applicable thereto." Id.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 256-60 for further explication of republican con-
stitutional values.
251. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
252. See generally Gregory, 111 S. Ct. 2395.
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traditionally conceived but also of principles such as federalism."3
From its earliest days, the Court has not considered itself bound by a
strict textualism bordering on literalism, nor should it. It has long rec-
ognized that "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are
postulates which limit and control." 4 Yet the postulate of federalism
as an operative, enforceable structure and set of values has largely
remained unexplored during the Constitution's third century.2s5 The
reasons for this lack of development are complex, ranging, for in-
stance, from the fear federalism might be used to restrict individual
liberties to a desire to permit the constitutional structure to continue
to evolve with the times. And so long as States exist in some fashion,
nationalists can argue that federalism is alive and well, and does not
require the Court's intrusion into the political decisions of Congress.
But these notions of federalism-minimalist federalism-are for-
malistic. Federalism was fashioned to achieve certain types of goals
and objectives; it should be understood in functional terms.25 These
understandings of federalism should not be restricted to the antique,
200-year-old realpolitik recognition that no national government could
have been ratified if it failed to provide for the continuing existence of
the States and their retention of significant powers. Rather, we should
253. See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 60-83 (1989); Paul Ba-
tor, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. Rnv 605
(1981).
254. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 318 (1934). Many if not most of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinions actively apply this principle.
255. By contrast, individual rights, including implied constitutional rights of privacy,
reproductive freedom, and minimum habitability, have received an abundance of atten-
tion. For discussion of structural/functional constitutional argumentation, see PHLIP BOB-
BITT, CONSTITrrIONAL FATE 74-92 (1982); CHARLES L. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW passim (1969). A nioteworthy use of structural/
functional argument in the federalism context may be found in Melvyn Durchslag, Should
Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DePaul L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1994). Regarding the Tenth Amendment, see Abrams Note, supra note 170.
256. Functionalism is not inimical to the positivism endorsed by the majority of the
Court's current members. No less auspicious a positivist than H.L.A. Hart advocates judi-
cial recognition of the values and purposes behind a law in determining its proper
interpretation.
[T]o be rational, a judicial decision must be made in the light of some conception
of what ought to be, [and] the aims, the social policies and purposes to which
judges should appeal if their decisions are to be rational, are themselves to be
considered as part of the law....
H.L.A. Hart, Legal Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv.
593 (1958). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues that, indeed, values-based jurisprudence
has been the primary method of American constitutional jurisprudence and that we must
recognize that a value-free interpretive method is impossible to achieve or practice. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrrrTION 133-38 (1987).
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endeavor to understand federalism as a value and structure within
which other constitutional values and objectives-both historic and
contemporary-can be safeguarded.
Why was it a political impossibility to abolish the States in 1787
and why is it at least imprudent to permit Congress to tread on that
path today? Because the American people realize that their ability to
assure a government responsive to their values and desires will be dif-
ficult to achieve if most or virtually all power to decide policy resides
in one national capital. Practical problems abound, ranging from the
cumbersome size of the national political agenda, to the effort re-
quired for citizens or small groups to gain the nation's attention, to the
concern that certain regions' political power would dwarf others' and
lead to neglect of the latter's interests, to the fear that concentration
of power would ineluctably lead to grave abuses against individual
and national interests.
The division of power and responsibility wrought by the Constitu-
tion under the rubric of federalism is designed to enhance and, indeed,
guarantee the republican process, which in turn minimizes the other-
wise persistent political externalities outlined above. These process
values include the opportunity to participate in political affairs, to
have one's participation matter, to forge communities that inculcate
particular sets of values and seek ends different in some respects from
other communities', and to fashion and push for acceptance on a na-
tional basis certain public values, objectives, and programs. Federal-
ism was inspired by commitments to a dynamic political society; it
provides a structure by which, even in today's complex world, these
process values can be achieved while giving wide berth to the nation's
needs as defined by the President and the Congress.
All other justifications for federalism are traceable to the basic
commitment to actualizing republican process values, whether they ar-
gue greater diversity of cultures, greater innovation in government, or
reduced threat of tyranny. This is the essential link between federal-
ism and individual rights to which Justice O'Connor adverted, but
which she did not develop; the notion of individual rights as exhausted
by the First through Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments simply
misses a critical group of rights. Indeed, we may term these process
values protected by federalism "meta-constitutional rights" because
they provide the grounding from which the movements seeking to de-
fend existing constitutional rights or to expand them must spring.2- 7 If
257. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
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we truly desire to ensure that we will have enduring yet an evolving
Constitution, one which can and will be responsive to the people258
during the next century and thereafter, then we must protect the
structures which shelter and foster the people's dialogue with the pub-
lic world.
Thus, the constitutional values most directly revealed in the
Guarantee Clause 9 actually underlie and inspire the entire docu-
ment. In turn, the federalism reflected most directly, but by no means
exclusively, in the Tenth Amendment is the structural mechanism by
which these meta-constitutional values are secured. Understood in
this manner, the Court's decision to enforce the Guarantee Clause's
values via the Tenth Amendment is defensible if not overdue.260
But even accepting this functional understanding of the Constitu-
tion, can New York be justified? Is the take-title provision endanger-
ing any of these values or the Federal structure itself to such a degree
that New York's precepts and boundaries are warranted? Clearly,
without these boundaries, the integrity of representative State govern-
ment would diminish markedly. Recall that, without New York, feder-
alism structures and values are nonjusticiable; federalism can be
traded away according to current expediency.2 61 The combination of
a nonjusticiable federalism and a constricted national budget leads to
exactly the kinds of incursions into the State fisc and policy-making
apparatus that pervade the pending health reform bills. Rather than
define national goals and raise funds directly through its taxing power,
with the attendant political costs, many of the plans seek to achieve
national goals by pushing the costs onto the State governments. Both
the States and their officials would bear the brunt of popular concern
over raised taxes or slashed services caused by national orders.
Though the explanation State leaders offer may be "the Feds made us
do it," technically that would be a misstatement; the Federal govern-
ment simply would have pilfered the State's coffers for its own
projects and potentially left the cupboard bare for the State's projects
and self-determined needs. Any justification that Congress and the
258. This thought contemplates both the formal amendment process and judicial "up-
dating." Both methods begin with important political movements in their support. The
Supreme Court simply cannot update constitutional principles, as per Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), without political support.
259. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
260. For a general discussion of republican values and their interrelation with federal-
ism, see Hoke, supra note 13, at 701-14, and sources cited therein.
261. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 256, at 29-30 (observing that constitutions are writ-
ten to protect deeply held beliefs and values from the pressures of passing political, eco-
nomic, or military expediency).
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nation can engage in these actions would seem at best counterintui-
tive. Certainly the constitutional explanation would be long and in-
volved, and ultimately unpersuasive.
The practical import of these incursions would be quite broad.2 62
The States' personnel, fisc, and control over their political agendas
would be greatly impeded, for presumptively, the Supremacy Clause
would make liabilities to the nation take precedence over local objec-
tives. Only the remainder would be left for the States to direct in
accordance with their citizen's values and needs. The "our-personnel-
are-your-personnel" rule might also chill State efforts to engage in ex-
perimentation with new programs. If new programs were fashioned,
their personnel could be utilized by the nation, and the new program
might also become the fodder for the latest Federal mandate.
Political accountability would also suffer because the legislative
power of the State could be conscripted and directed by the nation,
presumably either via Congress directly or via power delegated to a
Federal administrative agency. Tracing the responsibility for an action
undertaken by a State's government could become quite complex.
Under the new regime State officials' accountability would not lie pri-
marily to their constituents but would be divided between them and
national administrators. Holding elected representatives at each level
of government politically accountable to their constituents would be
difficult if not impossible.
Political participation and its role in constructing individuals'
commitment to their government would also be harmed by the new
Federal incursions. As the information and other transaction costs at
the national political level are being far greater than at the State and
local levels, the consequence of the nation becoming the only political
entity with real power to set goals and values will be that the range of
persons engaged in direct participation (rather than through interest
groups) will likely fall substantially. The New York Court properly
seeks to ensure that the political structures by which effective partici-
pation can transpire continue to have integrity and power.
Thus, New York's transformation of the inquiry governing adjudi-
cation of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment interaction did
not produce a troubling result. The Court, however, should have
openly revised precedent rather than having employed illusions like
the "mirror image." This analysis also suggests that revival of the
262. This differs with Professor Chemerinsky's view that the principles New York an-
nounces do not serve any of the traditional values of federalism. See C-EMERiNSKY, supra
note 256.
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Tenth Amendment's justiciability is warranted and that rendering cog-
nizable the Guaranty Clause's values and objectives via the Tenth
Amendment is creative and justifiable. In light of the Tenth Amend-
ment's importance, the Court correctly abjured a strict textualist ap-
proach. Moreover, the Court has refused to be so constrained
elsewhere in constitutional interpretation. Finally, New York's identi-
fication of unfunded Federal mandates as problematic will open an
array of litigation that legitimately forces Congress to revise members
of notions of the States as little more than instruments to be employed
for national projects.
IH. Applications: The Constitutionality of the Health Plans'
More Novel Forms of Interaction with State
Governments
The pending health reform plans employ seven potentially prob-
lematic models of regulatory interaction with State governments.
Congress' development of these strategies seems attributable, as sug-
gested, to the Federal budget deficit and perhaps as well to the green
light it perceived Garcia to have given for issuing Federal orders to
the States.263
If the health reform proposals are an indicator, Congress does not
appear to truly appreciate New York's reevaluation of Federal-State
relations nor its renewed assertion of justiciability for some Tenth
Amendment claims. Several models transgress the most unambiguous
principles of New York. Others test the margins of both that case and
the accepted breadth of the spending power. Though the outer
reaches of these principles may remain somewhat murky, it seems the
Court has fashioned the foundation for a body of manageable stan-
dards for adjudicating this genre of Tenth Amendment claims. This
Part examines the constitutionality of each model of Federal-State in-
teraction that the health reform bills advance.
A. Federal Regulation of Non-Federal Public Sector Employee
Benefits
Many of the health care reform proposals have not directly ad-
dressed whether their provisions would include employees of State
and local governments. The Clinton and Chafee plans, on the other
hand, would clearly cover all employees. In particular, the President's
263. The LLRWPA, which New York ruled unconstitutional in part, was enacted in De-
cember 1985, just months after Garcia was decided.
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plan emphasizes that all governmental employees, regardless whether
Federal, State, or local, would be covered under its provisions.2 This
mandate poses the question whether Federal legislation can require
State governments to comply with the general requirements placed
upon all employers, such as paying 80% of health insurance premi-
ums.26 Does the Tenth Amendment bar this Federal mandate?
Despite the interposition of New York, Garcia clearly and cor-
rectly controls the outcome of this question. According to New York,
Garcia did not find a Tenth Amendment obstacle to legislation under
the commerce power where the legislation has general applicability to
the private sector and has not singled out the States for special bur-
dens. 266 New York explicitly left this proposition untouched.2 67 Be-
cause the Clinton bill would compel all employers of a particular size
to pay the same percentage of the employment benefit, treating State
governments in the same fashion as private employers in virtually all
respects,268 the mandate is permissible.
The Chafee bill requires all employers, including governments, to
offer their employees insurance coverage and to handle the adminis-
trative overhead for payroll deductions. 269 Again, because this man-
date has general applicability to both the private and public sectors, it
satisfies the Tenth Amendment under Garcia.
264. See HSA § 1001 (defining scope of Act's coverage); See also Clinton Description,
supra note 1, at 7.
265. See HSA §§ 6121-6122.
266. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. 528).
267. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420. In New York, the Court explained that the case did
not require revisiting the holding in Garcia because the legislation at issue in New York
was directed exclusively at the States and so did not impose obligations of general applica-
bility. Id. Professor Chemerinsky has quite correctly argued, however, that despite this
disclaimer some of the larger principles and underlying values of New York implicitly un-
dermine Garcia. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism as Constitutional Structure, unpublished
paper delivered to the Association of American Law Schools, Conference on Constitu-
tional Law (June 16, 1993).
268. The exception is that States are barred from forming an exclusive insurance
purchasing cooperative ("corporate alliance"), though other large employers are permitted
to do so. The plan excludes all governmental employers other than the United States Pos-
tal Service from the provision permitting large employers to form their own exclusive alli-
ances. See HSA § 1311(b)(2). Because State and Federal governments are treated in the
same fashion, it is unlikely that this singular exception will support a finding that the Clin-
ton plan does not subject State governments "to the same legislation applicable to private
parties." New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2420.
269. S. 1770 § 1004.
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B. Untethered Regulatory Command
Under this model, the Federal government commands States to
institute a particular regulatory program, but if a State does not com-
ply, the Federal government does not institute the program within the
State. The Federal government's command to States to regulate is
further unaccompanied by either financial incentives for compliance
or penalties for noncompliance. Thus, under this model, the Federal
government employs neither of the two constitutional methods for
coaxing States to regulate in a specific manner.270
1. Use of the Untethered Regulatory Command
The Michel bill employs this model in one area, the creation and
enforcement of "risk management" programs.2 71 States are simply or-
dered, as a matter of Federal law, to use State law to compel health
care professionals' participation in a program designed to warn them
and other State agencies, such as licensing boards, that particular
practices may injure patients. The bill also requires States to compel
insurers of health professionals to institute risk management programs
as specified. 72 The bill does not specify a Federal default mechanism
should a State not comply.
The Cooper bill also employs the untethered regulatory com-
mand. Unlike the Michel bill, which uses this model to achieve a tan-
gential objective, Representative Cooper utilizes it to establish a
270. The two methods adjudicated as permissible under New York are conditional pre-
emption and conditional grants. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-27. There may be other
constitutionally permissible methods of inducing States to undertake certain actions that
do not impair the integrity of State legislative functions. Under one such method, likely
never to be adjudicated, a branch of the Federal government enunciates national goals and
distributes ideas and information in their support, but does nothing more. For example,
the proposed Gender Equity in Education Act, H.R. 1793, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
seeks to end sexual harassment at all educational levels. Yet while the Act permits schools
to utilize Federal money otherwise obtained for this instructional purpose, it does not re-
quire or separately finance this use. See Catherine S. Manegold, Bill Seeks Equality of
Sexes in School, N.Y. Tivms, Feb. 13, 1994, at 34.
271. See H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2043 (1994) (emphasis added):
(a) Requirements for Providers. - Each State shall require each health care pro-
fessional and health care provider providing services in the State to participate in
a risk management program to prevent and provide early warning of practices
which may result in injuries to patients or which otherwise may endanger patient
safety.
(b) Requirements for Insurers. - Each State shall require each entity which pro-
vides health care professional or provider liability insurance to health care profes-
sionals and health care providers in the State to -
(1) establish risk management programs ....
272. Id.
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mechanism central to his reform plan. The Cooper "Managed Com-
petition" bill relies on the creation of insurance purchasing coopera-
tives to reform the health insurance market and drive down costs of
insurance. But his bill commands States to set up the purchasing co-
operatives without the plan employing either financial inducements or
the threat of preemption.2 73 Even though the cooperatives constitute
the pivotal part of his plan, Representative Cooper does not specify a
Federal default mechanism in case a State does not comply. This
omission suggests that the Cooper bill conceives of State governments
as subject to direct orders by the Federal government mandating that
they undertake a particular Federal regulatory scheme as a matter of
State law.
2. Objections to the Untethered Regulatory Command
To avoid ruling directly on the constitutionality of an untethered
regulatory command, one approach the Court takes is to construe the
offending provision as a request rather than a command.274 Under
this approach, the choice available to the State is either to accede to
the Federal request or to exit the field. The Court has previously up-
held such a choice because it does not "'directly compel[ ]' the State[ ]
to enact a [Federal] legislative program."2 75 FERC ruled this a per-
missible choice to present to States even where the Federal govern-
ment "has failed to provide'an alternative regulatory mechanism to
police the area" in the event a State exits the field.276
New York, however, repeatedly emphasizes that the Federal com-
merce power does not encompass direct orders to State governments
commanding them to utilize their governmental powers in service of
Federal legislative objectives. 77 Federal statutes containing such or-
ders do not merely misconceive the scope of the commerce power;
they also exhibit a conception of State governments not countenanced
by the Constitution. Such statutes' commands are predicated upon
the erroneous view that State governments may be ordered about like
subordinates, and that their budgets and personnel are fair game for
the national legislature.
273. H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1101(b)(1) (1994) provides: "Each State shall
provide, by legislation or otherwise, for the establishment by not later than July 1, 1994, as
a not-for-profit corporation, with respect to [each geographic area] a health plan purchas-
ing cooperative ...."
274. FERC, 456 U.S. at 765.
275. Id.
276. Id at 766.
277. See supra note 213.
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Untethered regulatory commands violate not only this core New
York principle but also one of the central rationales for its recognition.
Approving this type of command transgresses the constitutional value
of political accountability. Arguably, the State's option to exit the
field rather than regulate according to Federal standards is an "alter-
native" which, under FERC, would render an untethered regulatory
command constitutional. 78 But the "option" of exit is illusory-and
in many more fields than the utility rate-setting at issue in FERC or
the regulation of medical professionals. Because no Federal regula-
tory default exists in case of State nonconsent, a State's "choice" to
exit would lead to a regulatory vacuum having significant public policy
and perhaps public safety consequences. 279 Should this occur, whom
would the public properly hold accountable? The Federal govern-
ment would deny responsibility, asserting the choice was the State's.
The State would also deny responsibility, asserting that the Federal
government sought to impose huge costs on the State's citizenry, who
could only be protected by the State's exit. Thus, each government
would be able to blame the other, and political accountability, as well
as the public interest, would suffer.2 0
If the Court declines to interpret untethered regulatory orders as
implying an alternative for the State to exit the regulatory field, Con-
gress would effectively be required to specify this option explicitly,
along with any alternatives a State might have other than regulating
according to Federal standards. Such a rule would promote political
responsibility in a variety of ways, analogous to the accountability and
precision that arise from requiring the Federal government to state
explicitly any conditions on Federal grants 281 Indeed, it would be tan-
tamount to a rule recognizing conditional preemption only where
Congress has stated its intent explicitly-which would not be particu-
larly exceptional.28
This recommendation is warranted for an additional reason: the
Court will presume "Congress did not intend to preempt State law"
278. FERC, 456 U.S. at 766.
279. See, e.g., Susan Foote, Regulatory Vacuums: Federalism, Deregulation, and Judicial
Review, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 113 (1985); Hoke, supra note 13.
280. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432.
281. Cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (requiring
conditions on Federal grants to be stated explicitly).
282. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAz.i. L. REv. 593, passim (1992).
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unless it does so explicitly." 3 The FERC approach-implying from
untethered regulatory commands an option for States to be pre-
empted from and exit a regulatory field-runs directly counter to the
preemption axioms the Court, has repeatedly emphasized in recent
years.
Thus, it is improper for the Court to manipulate an untethered
regulatory command into an implied conditional preemption provi-
sion. Congress may not have considered the alternative of requiring a
State to exit a field if it did not regulate according to Federal stan-
dards. Moreover, by definition, an untethered regulatory command
provides no Federal regulatory default, so a Court's attempt to trans-
mute it into a form of conditional preemption ineluctably generates a
regulatory vacuum. By refusing to imply conditional preemption in
such situations, and requiring Congress to state explicitly not only any
Federal conditions to be met but also the preemptible field targeted if
the State declines to meet the conditions, the Court can enhance the
values of political accountability and follow its otherwise sound consti-
tutional rules disfavoring judicial implication of preemption.
Applying this approach to the provisions using this model in the
Michel and Cooper bills, neither would be saved, because under New
York, courts will not imply a State option to exit the regulatory field.
The offending Michel provision can likely be severed from the balance
of the bill.284 But the Cooper bill employs the model to institute the
pivotal portion of its reform plan. Because it cannot be severed from
the bill,2 5 if enacted as written, it would properly be held facially
invalid.
C. Command Plus Conditional Preemption
Under this model, the Federal government orders States to enact
a regulatory program that adopts specified Federal standards. If the
State does not comply, the Federal government implements the stan-
dards within the state, ousting the State from regulatory jurisdiction
over the matter.
Conditional preemption alone is generally not problematic:
"[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under
the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer
283. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,746 (1981); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,206 (1983); Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
284. See, e.g., New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425-27.
285. See iL
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States the choice of regulating that activity according to Federal stan-
dards or having State law preempted by Federal regulation." 2,6 The
only serious question posed by this model is whether the inclusion of a
proscribed command constitutionally taints the otherwise permissible
conditional preemption.
Senator Chafee's bill employs conditional preemption in two sep-
arate instances. The bill commands States to establish the regulatory
system necessary to implement the Federal health reforms, specifying
such tasks as certifying health plans if they satisfy Federal standards
and enforcing the reform standards." If a State declines to accept
the Federal role, or if its compliance lapses after agreeing to partici-
pate, the Secretary of HHS assumes the responsibilities that would
otherwise be entrusted to the State. The bill also orders States to es-
tablish a medical malpractice ADR process that complies with one of
the Federally specified formats stated in the bill, with the States to be
preempted if they do not.
Senator Nickles's bill is somewhat ambiguous on a critical point.
The bill technically provides the preemption default of HHS "as-
sum[ing] responsibility with regard to health insurance plans within
the State" only for those States that were once in compliance with the
Act.288 Thus, the bill could be interpreted to impose an untethered
regulatory command,289 which would arguably violate Tenth Amend-
ment principles.290 Because the Nickles bill envisions the Federal de-
fault element for "noncomplying" States, this analysis assumes the bill
meant to include as "noncomplying" all States declining to comply
with the command. Interpreted in this way, both the provision and
the plan as a whole may survive a Tenth Amendment challenge.
The Michel bill indulges in conditional preemption in two core
portions of the plan. Two provisions directly order the States to en-
gage in certain regulatory activity; in each, States are ordered to sub-
286. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424. See also Rotunda, supra note 6.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24.
288. Senator Nickles's bill provides:
The Secretary [of HHS] periodically shall review each State regulatory program
to determine if such program continues to meet and enforce the standards referred
to in section 118.... If the Secretary makes a final determination that the State
regulatory program fails to meet and enforce such standards .... the Secretary
shall decertify such program and assume responsibility with respect to health in-
surance plans in the State.
S. 1743 § 117(b) (emphasis added). This provision immediately follows that commanding
the States to "establish a regulatory program which meets the standards" delineated in a
later section of the act. Id. § 117(a).
289. See generally supra text accompanying notes 270-85.
290. Id.
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mit to HHS "a report on steps the State is taking to implement and
enforce" Federal regulatory standards. The bill explicitly contem-
plates that State legislation will be required in some cases,29 1 and the
plan accords extra time for State legislatures to meet to enact the nec-
essary laws. 2 Unlike the Nickles bill, the Michel bill explicitly pro-
vides for a Federal regulatory default in case of State noncompliance,
whether at the outset or subsequent to prior compliance. If a State
has been persistently noncompliant, the bill provides, the Secretary of
HHS will assume responsibility "for the implementation and enforce-
ment of [Federal] standards in the State as the Secretary determines to
be appropriate. 293
The question, then, is whether the bills' language commanding
the States to engage in certain regulatory conduct according to Fed-
eral regulatory standards constitutionally corrupts the otherwise per-
missible conditional preemption structure of the bills. The most direct
authority on this question is provided by New York, although it still
fails to yield a clear answer to the question of taint. On the one hand,
New York repeatedly emphasized that the Federal government's com-
merce power does not extend to conscripting State governments in
service of the national regulatory objectives. 94 Commands to State
governments, even if softened by language creating a Federal regula-
tory default, still bespeak "a fundamental misunderstanding of the
role state governments play in our regulatory system. ' 295 Yet New
York also employed an interpretive principle that permitted the Court
to deny the literal import of statutory language apparently asserting a
congressional power to conscript the State legislatures and administra-
tors to perform Federal regulatory tasks. Instead, the Court read the
putatively offending provision within the context of the statute as a
whole.2 96 Thus, at a holistic interpretive level, a potentially problem-
atic statute still can be fitted into the conditional preemption model.
291. The relevant language of H.R. 3080 § 1103(b)(1)(A) reads: "Each State shall sub-
mit to the Secretary, by the deadline specified in subparagraph (B), a report on steps the
State is taking to implement and enforce the consumer protection standards with respect to
insurers, and MedAccess plans offered, not later than such deadline." See also id.
§ 1103(b)(2)(A) (requiring same conduct of States in identical language but pertaining to
creation and enforcement of other standards).
292. See id. § 1103(b)(1)(B)(ii) (detailing a longer period of time for State legislatures
to act).
293. Id. § 1103(b)(2).
294. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
295. FERC, 456 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
296. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2425 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)) (endorsing avoidance of
constitutional question when an alternate reading of the statute is reasonably available).
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By this approach, the Court avoids exalting form over substance, and
does not expend scarce institutional resources297 on a philosophical
point. Because New York continues to approve reading a Federal
command as merely hortatory within an otherwise unexceptionable
conditional preemption statute, the command plus conditional pre-
emption model will continue to survive Tenth Amendment scrutiny 98
D. Command, Conditional Preemption, Plus State "Fee"
This model arises where the Federal government commands
States to engage in a particular regulatory activity according to Fed-
eral norms. If the State fails to do so or declines the "invitation," the
Federal government implements the program within the noncomply-
ing State and charges the State a "fee" or tax for the regulatory pro-
gram. Three of the reform bills, the Michel, Cooper, and Nickles bills,
employ some version of this novel regulatory model.
As discussed above, the Court is likely to continue to find no
Tenth Amendment obstacles to otherwise permissible uses of condi-
tional preemption; the Court may grouse about the erroneous pre-
sumption of Federal authority to mandate State legislative
enactments, but it will conceive statutes holistically as instances of
conditional preemption. This model does, however, raise two novel
questions: Will such a statute still be constitutional if Congress seeks
to compel a State government to pay for a regulatory program the
State refused to adopt as a matter of State law? Further, does the
answer to the previous question change depending upon whether the
Federal government seeks reimbursement for monies beyond its ac-
tual costs in instituting the program within the state?
1. Use of the Command, Conditional Preemption, Plus State Fee
Model
The Michel and Cooper bills both use this model in mandating
that States institute a Federally approved alternative dispute process-
ing (ADR) system for medical malpractice cases. The Michel bill
specifies that if a State does not comply, HHS is to implement the
297. See Redish & Drizin, supra note 171; Choper, supra note 13.
298. Given the aggressiveness with which Congress is attempting to expand its regula-
tory control over the nation without paying the costs, the Court will eventually have to
consider Justice O'Connor's concern that the States' formal option to exit the field does
not cure Federal commands to State governments of Tenth Amendment problems.
"[D]ismemberment of State government is [not] the correct solution to a Tenth Amend-
ment challenge." FERC, 456 U.S. at 782 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
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Federal ADR system within the State. 99 The bill also provides for the
Federal government to recoup directly from the noncomplying State
its costs of providing this service. ° The Cooper bill differs only in
that it commands the State to pay "110% of the costs incurred by the
United States" for instituting and maintaining the ADR system.3 °
The other instances of conditional preemption and imposition of
a fee on State governments appear in identical language in the Michel
and Nickles bills.30 2 The fee they impose upon State governments is
contingent upon whether a State complies with the requirement to
institute a Federally approved regulatory program under which the
State would collect comparative information about the success and
monetary value of various health insurance plans offered within its
jurisdiction. The obvious goal is to lower information costs and raise
the likelihood that consumers will select their health insurers pru-
dently. If the State itself chooses to provide the regulatory service
under Federal supervision, then it will not owe monies to H-S under
the provision. 3
The reasoning behind this State fee model merits some attention.
To its credit, the approach addresses the free rider problem.3 4 This
problem arises because the States would be situated differently with
299. H.R. 3080 § 2032(b)(1).
300. The provision reads: "the State shall reimburse the United States (at such time and
in such manner as the Secretary may require) for the costs incurred by the United States
during the year as a result of the application of the system with respect to the State." Id.
§ 2032(b)(3)(A). The Michel bill additionally provides that no State using a Federal ADR
system may be paid funds "pursuant to the Public Health Service Act." Id.
§ 2032(b)(3)(B). The curtailment of State eligibility for an important pot of Federal health
monies is in addition to the fees charged to the State and therefore does not modify this
analysis.
301. H.R. 3222 § 5202(b)(3). The Cooper bill also provides a financial incentive for
compliance: for States that are in compliance with the provision, HHS may provide grants
to offset some of the costs of maintaining the ADR program. See id. § 5203(a). Unlike the
Michel bill, it does not curtail State eligibility for Public Health Service monies as a penalty
for noncompliance,
302. See S. 1743 § 422(b); H.R. 3080 § 2122(b).
303. The bills oddly depart from stating the fees requirement in the normal active voice,
so as a technical matter the bills do not clearly state that they intend noncomplying States
to repay HHS. Because the context suggests States are the targets of this fee, this analysis
assumes the bills intend that result.. If only private sector entities will be charged these
fees, such as insurers as a cost of doing business in the State, the Tenth Amendment will
not be triggered.
304. For a classic statement of the free rider problem, see THE MIT DICrIONARY OF
MODERN ECONOMICS 162 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986). For a philosophical discus-
sion of free riding, see Jom RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 267-70 (1971). For a more
theoretical discussion of incentive compatibility, of which the free rider problem is a sub-
set, see 2 THE NEw PALGRAVE: A DICrIONARY OF ECONOMICS 739-40 (John Eatwell et aL
eds. 1987). See also Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
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regard to implementing new Federal regulatory programs. Some
States presumably would still shoulder the regulatory duties sought to
be imposed by these bills, perhaps because they already have similar
programs that could be easily adapted to meet the Federal require-
ments. Other States, particularly those having to design and create
the program from scratch, would face significant costs that may re-
quire new revenues. Where the Federal government considers it criti-
cal to apply of the particular regulatory program, a State could decide
not to institute (and pay for) the apparatus itself, knowing the Federal
government would supply a program in the wake of the State's re-
fusal, courtesy of the Federal fisc instead of its own. The State would
thus receive the Federal program's benefits without having to pay for
it out of its own coffers, effectively spreading the program's costs to
the nation rather than to its own citizenry. The State's officials would
not suffer politically from either raising State taxes or reducing funds
to existing programs, its citizens would retain additional marginal dis-
posable income (which is potentially beneficial to the State's econ-
omy), and the State as a whole would benefit at the expense of the
nation, raising a distributive justice problem.305
2. Objections to Command, Conditional Preemption, Plus State Fee
Despite the fact that it addresses the free rider problem, even a
cursory analysis of the State fee model raises serious objections. The
provisions at issue seek to impose an open-ended liability on uncon-
senting States. States would have to pay whatever costs are incurred
by the Federal government in creating and maintaining the particular
regulatory program. The provisions do not impose any structural in-
centive upon the Federal government to keep the costs of programs
reasonable." 6 It has statutorily guaranteed access to the State's purse,
for whatever sums the Federal government spends.30 7 The primary
305. See, e.g., Rawls supra note 304, at 258-332; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LBERALISM AND
THE LIMrrs OF JusTICE 66-103 (1982); ERNEST BARKER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 338-43 (1959).
306. For example, first class airfare, expensive realty, office furnishings, excessive
phone bills, and other costs could be charged to the State. The noncomplying States would
also presumably find themselves charged a percentage of HHS and perhaps even White
House overhead costs. For an analogue, recall the debate over universities charging the
Federal government excessive percentages of overhead as a cost of Federal grants received.
See, e.g., Michael K. Frisby, U.S. Review Finds Colleges Misused $14M, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 10, 1991, at 3; Auditors Viewing Yale's Books, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1,1991, at 37; U.S.
to Audit 4 Schools That Receive Grants, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, April 5, 1991, at 10.
307. The lack of restraint inherit in this model might be mitigated by imposing a duty of
frugality on the Federal government, or otherwise limiting the States' liability to liquidated
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economic goal of efficient use of resources-a persistently elusive goal
for the Federal government-would be obstructed structurally to an
even greater degree.
Notwithstanding the possible economic imprudence of the strat-
egy, though, does the Tenth Amendment pose a barrier to Federal
legislation adopting this model? It would seem that New York clearly
undermines the constitutionality of this strategy, for the scheme again
presents States with ephemeral "choices." Recall that the take-title
provision in New York explicitly offered State governments a choice
either of accepting an open-ended liability or of regulating according
to Congress' instructions. The health care provisions employing this
model offer State governments a similar choice: either accept the
open-ended liability of paying the Federal government's expenses in
establishing and maintaining the program or "regulate according to
the instructions of Congress."30 8
Under New York, the first analytical step is to assess whether
Congress can "impose either option as a freestanding requirement. '30 9
The Court noted Congress was barred from effecting a "forced trans-
fer" of the waste there at issue because it was essentially "a congres-
sionally compelled subsidy from State governments" to waste
producers. Nor could the Act compel the State to become liable for
the generators' damages. Such a provision "would be indistinguish-
able from an Act of Congress directing the States to assume the liabil-
ity of certain State residents. 3 10 Does it make a difference that the
problematic health reform provisions would have unconsenting States
assume the liabilities of the Federal government?
The explicit rationale offered for New York's invalidation of the
take-title provision renders these subtleties to be distinctions without
a difference. The Tenth Amendment bars Federal requirements that
would "'commandeer' State governments into the service of Federal
regulatory purposes. 1131 National health reform pursuant to congres-
sional enactment is unquestionably a Federal regulatory effort. That
it is the Federal government's expenses rather than those of private
entities that the Acts would authorize to be collected from State gov-
ernments intensifies rather than diminishes the Tenth Amendment of-
amounts. These measures would not eliminate the constitutional question, but would serve
to lessen somewhat the impact of this model on a State's fisc.
308. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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fense,312  for it subordinates the State's fisc to the Federal
government. 13 In short, "[a] choice between two unconstitutionally
coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all. 314 These strategies
violate the Tenth Amendment as interpreted by New York.
E. Command, Conditional Preemption, Plus Private Sector Tax
Under this model of Federal-State relations, if a State declines to
employ its governing powers in a manner defined by a Federal condi-
tional preemption statute, the Federal government unilaterally imple-
ments its program within the State, then levies a special tax against
private individuals and entities within the noncomplying State who are
related in some way to the Federal program. 'Two bills employ this
mechanism. They differ dramatically, however, in their economic im-
pact within a noncomplying State.
1. Use of Command, Conditional Preemption, Plus Private Sector Tax
The Michel bill seeks to have each State adopt a Federally ap-
proved reinsurance or allocation of risk mechanism, largely for the
purpose of covering any employers who pose unusually high costs for
an insurer. 15 Similar mechanisms, widely adopted in the automobile
insuranqe industry, assist in spreading among all insurers a fair allot-
ment of the higher risk insureds. Under the Michel bill, any State that
does not comply with this particular mandate will find HHS instituting
the mechanism within its borders. 316 The bill specifies further that the
Federal program within the State will be paid for by a flat tax on all
insurance sold to employers to cover employees in a particular non-
complying state, of a percentage estimated by HHS "as generating
sufficient revenues" to implement the Federal risk program.31 7 No
particular surcharge level is specified in the bill; it defers the exact rate
of the tax to HHS.
312. The lack of choice cannot be cured by according States substantial discretion. See
New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428-29.
313. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978), neither undermines this con-
clusion nor is undermined by it. There the Court ruled that a Federal aircraft tax imposed
on each plane used in United States airspace, whether owned by a private entity or a State
government, did not offend the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. Such a tax is
permitted under Garcia principles, which are not displaced by New York. See supra text
accompanying notes 264-69.
314. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
315. See H.R. 3080 § 1106.
316. Id. § 1106(b)(2).
317. Id. § 1106(b)(2)(D)(i).
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One core section of the Clinton bill also employs this model. In
States that do not choose to become "participating States," or which
later fall out of compliance, HHS takes over the task of establishing
and monitoring the insurance purchasing cooperatives ("alliances")
through which most persons would obtain insurance. In such States,
the insurance premiums sold through the regional alliances will be
subject to a 15% surcharge, ostensibly to reimburse HHS for its ad-
ministrative costs in establishing and operating the system.3 18 The pe-
culiarity of the size of the surcharge is that the administrative costs of
establishing and monitoring the alliances should be quite small. The
normally sizable costs of administering the health plans themselves
would continue to be borne by insurance carriers.319 The 15%
surcharge therefore seems punitive in nature, because it is presump-
tively far higher than the cost to the Federal government of forming
and monitoring the alliances. A concrete indicator that the 15%
charge is punitive rather than merely compensatory (of administrative
costs) lies in comparing it against the maximum administrative fee a
regional alliance is permitted to charge-2.5% of the value of premi-
ums expected to be sold E.3  Moreover, the Secretary is entitled to re-
ceive a flat rate per year regardless of the actual costs incurred.3 21 In
an average State, the income to the Secretary would appear to be sev-
eral billion dollars per year.3 22
318. HSA § 1523(a) reads:
If this subpart [Responsibilities in Absence of State Systems] applies to a State
for a calendar year, the premiums charged under the regional alliance established
and operated by the Secretary in the State shall be equal to premiums that would
otherwise be charged under a regional alliance established and operated by the
State, increased by 15 percent. Such 15 percent increase shall be used to reim-
burse the Secretary for any administrative or other expenses incurred as a result
of establishing and operating the system.
The surcharge would be assessed only against the premiums of plans sold through the
regional alliances, not through the private corporate alliances. The bill further specifies
that the surcharge shall be treated as part of the premium cost for purposes of complying
with the Federally set global budget and per capita insurance limits. Id. § 1523(b). This
proviso could result in a net reduction of health benefits.
319. It is, of course, one of the aims of the Clinton plan that "managed competition"
and the alliances will reduce these administrative costs.
320. See HSA § 1352(c).
321. Oddly, the bill also includes authorization of $100 million for planning grants to
help States become "participating," lISA § 1515(a)(3), and $1.25 billion in grants for
States' regulatory start-up costs, HSA § 1515(b)(4). Although authorization hardly is
equivalent to an actual budget allocation, the bill clearly contemplates that the Secretary
will have substantial new sums for implementation.
322. For example, consider a medium sized State with approximately 8 million persons
buying health insurance directly or indirectly through the regional alliances. Assuming the
average annual cost of the President's comprehensive health insurance for a family is
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2. Constitutional Questions
Placing the surcharge on health insurance sold through the re-
gional cooperatives rather than directly on the noncomplying State
may be an attempt both to sidestep Tenth Amendment problems and
to generate substantial political costs for any State administration de-
clining to participate. The question, then, is not simply whether Con-
gress may assess a special tax of private individuals and entities within
a State to fund a particular regulatory effort there, but whether the
Tenth Amendment interposes any obstacles to such regulatory tech-
niques where the special tax has the purpose or effect of coercing the
State to accede to the particular regulatory duties Congress seeks to
impose.
In statutes using this model of Federal-State relations, Congress
exercises two of its enumerated powers. Congress' power to tax is
explicitly granted,323 and few restrictions on that broad power have
been recognized.3 24 For purposes of this analysis, this Part assumes no
restriction other than the Tenth Amendment would apply.3' Con-
gress also employs the commerce power in setting up this type of reg-
ulatory program. Thus, the technique of taxing private individuals
and entities in nonconsenting States seems to fall easily within broadly
enumerated Federal powers and not to pose any Tenth Amendment
$5000, with 2 million families purchasing it, and for an individual is $2500, with 2.5 million
persons purchasing that coverage, the 15% surcharge ostensibly for paying for the adminis-
tration of the alliances in this State would produce several billion dollars (roughly $1.5
billion in charges from family coverage and $.94 billion in individual coverage, for a total of
$2.44 billion). These charges substantially exceed the costs of maintaining the alliances
within a State, or of compensating the Secretary for reasonable annual Federal costs in
monitoring the alliance. These administrative charges also tend to belie President Clin-
ton's description of alliances: "they are not supposed to be government groups-they are
co-ops of purchasers that are private." See Ifil, supra note 79, at A8.
323. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
324. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1982) (quoting
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940)).
325. Two potential theories which are beyond the scope of this paper but which may
pose independent obstacles to the punitive and coercive use of the taxing power toward
particular States are the uniformity requirement imposed by Article I, § 8, clause 1, and the
bar on discriminatory taxation, a branch of the intergovernmental tax immunity. As to the
latter, the vigor of the States' side of the intergovernmental tax immunity is currently in
doubt, see South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), but may be revitalized in an
egregious situation. See also New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587 (1946) (Stone,
CJ. concurring) (Some taxes, when applied to states, would "impair the sovereign status of
the State quite as much as a like tax imposed by a State on... activities of the national
government. This is not because the tax [is] discriminatory but because a sovereign gov-
ernment is the taxpayer, and the tax, though non-discriminatory, may be regarded as in-
fringing its sovereignty.") (citations omitted).
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problems.32 6 The Tenth Amendment analysis arguably ends there, es-
pecially since the Court has counseled that judicial inquiry into the
congressional motives underlying tax legislation is improper.327
3. Avoiding Circumvention of New York
Although it may be difficult to craft manageable judicial stan-
dards for achieving meaningful heightened scrutiny of this technique,
sound reasons support that effort. At stake is whether the Federal
government can achieve through the back door what it is barred from
doing through the front. At present, the Federal government is per-
mitted to coax States into the activities the Federal government
desires by either of two basic methods: conditional grant programs,
pursuant to the spending power, or conditional preemption, under the
commerce power.328 These are the front door methods. If the States
do not accept a grant or voluntarily legislate in accordance with Fed-
eral norms, the Federal government may implement its own regula-
tory program and pay for it directly.32 9 State residents can then direct
their State government to "devote its attention and resources to
problems other than those deemed important by Congress, [and] may
choose to have the Federal Government bear the expense of a Feder-
ally mandated regulatory program ..... 330
Under the technique in question, as an adjunct to conditional pre-
emption, the Federal government imposes a special tax on private citi-
zens and entities in any State that refuses to institute the Federal
regulatory program. But it is not a small charge to offset some of the
added expenses the Federal government may shoulder in instituting
the program within the state; it is a charge that may far exceed the
costs of instituting the Federal program. State officials know their citi-
zens will learn of the taxation differential, and they also know they
will be blamed for making the decision that caused taxes to rise. Yet it
326. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417 (The inquiries are "mirror images of each other.
If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly
disclaims any reservation of that power to the States.... ."); but see Redish & Drizin, supra
note 171, at 13 ("Under the structure imposed by the text, any analysis of whether the
national government has unconstitutionally encroached upon State authority must focus
solely on the nature of the national activity. If the activity falls within the scope of a
checklisted power, it is legitimate.").
327. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59-60 (1904). See also LAURENCE H.
TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTruTiONAL LAW § 5-9, at 320 (2d ed. 1988).
328. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423-24. For consideration of additional possible Fed-
eral methods, see supra text accompanying notes 210-62.
329. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
330. Id.
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would have been Federal officials who instituted the regulatory and
conditional taxation requirements. As troubled the New York Court,
fines of political responsibility for the tax will thus be confused, and
political accountability will be disrupted.33' Ultimately, by this "con-
ditional taxation" States will again be faced with an ephemeral choice:
either institute a regulatory program that meets Federal standards or
take the political responsibility for substantially increased taxes on
their citizenry.
The accountability problems in this technique may be magnified
significantly if Congress begins to employ this approach more broadly.
Congress need not find the monies to pay for regulatory programs, or
for grants to entice States to shoulder the programs under Federal
supervision, but only need fashion a special tax to fall upon citizens in
States declining to comply with Federal regulatory commands. If this
technique were permitted in the regulatory situation at issue in New
York, for instance, the Federal government could legislate that either
the State comply with all of the radioactive waste siting activities and
timetables or its citizens would find themselves faced with a 25%
surcharge on all utilities bills. Federal legislation could also be written
such that if a State did not comply with the regulatory statute at issue
in FERC332 governing rate-setting procedures for electric utilities,
then its citizens would be charged a 15% surcharge on power bills to
facilitate the Federal government's program. Because of citizen resist-
ance to these taxes, States may be compelled to institute the Federal
program. Virtually all Federal regulatory programs could be effec-
tively transferred to the States' purses by this technique. The ultimate
result would be to convert State governments into bureaucratic field
offices for the Federal government-the exact conception of federal-
ism that New York properly repudiated 33 3 -only it would be achieved
via the back door method of coercion. 34
331. Id.
332. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
333. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434.
334. Another less veiled way of achieving the same kind of end would be for the Fed-
eral government to bar tax deductions for health care insurance unless the taxpayer is
domiciled in a State that has assumed the regulatory responsibilities for the Federal health
reform program. The better doctrinal solution to these problems lies not in the Tenth
Amendment but in refurbishing some version of the branch of intergovernmental tax im-
munity doctrine barring discriminatory taxation, as mentioned supra note 325. See gener-
ally South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (discussing the intricacies of the doctrine
but perceiving it to be an incident of the Tenth Amendment). Although the discretion
committed to the legislature in exercising the taxing power and in fashioning distinctions is
quite broad, see Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), this might be
the sounder doctrinal course.
566
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This model's constitutionality is not directly addressed and gov-
erned by New York, and tests the boundaries of that decision. Under
current commerce power precedent as presented in New York, the
technique could be held valid, though this analysis suggests the
Court's principles concerning commandeering State legislative power
would be thwarted by such a result.
F. Private Sector Penalties for State Nonparticipation
In this unusual approach to coaxing a State to undertake Feder-
ally assigned regulatory responsibilities, a State government that does
not comply is not directly penalized. Rather, penalties are exacted
against activities of private individuals and entities within the noncom-
pliant State. The tacit objective behind this strategy appears to be to
provoke intrastate political pressure sufficient to compel the State to
assume the regulatory burden the Federal government has delineated.
The distinction between the previous model, command, conditional
preemption, plus private sector tax, and the present model is that while
both exert pressure on individuals and entities within a State to induce
State compliance, the former model exerts this pressure by special tax-
ation, and the present model does so by other types of penalties.
Only one plan employs this model, and in only one area. The
President's reform plan contains a section that seeks to induce States
to develop Federally-approved regulatory programs to govern the sale
of long-term care insurance. The bill authorizes significant monies to
be used exclusively for State grants, which serves as the carrot for in-
stituting this program.3 Yet if a State fails to establish a federally-
approved program, no Federal regulatory default would be activated.
Instead, "no insurer may sell or offer for sale any long-term care in-
surance policy" in the offending State.336
The proponents of the constitutionality of this regulatory tech-
nique would reason that it employs the broad commerce power in a
manner that cannot be questioned. It does not exercise regulatory
power against State governments but orders the conduct of private
actors, the purveyors of long-term health insurance. Given the "mir-
ror-image" analysis concerning the intersection of the Tenth Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause, the conclusion that the regulation
335. HSA §§ 2342, 2346.
336. Id. §§ 2344, 2346. Moreover, this provision barring the sale of long-term care in-
surance is enforceable by HHS via a civil money penalty for the greater of either $10,000
or three times any commission for each policy sold or offered in violation of this section of
the act. See id. § 2346(b).
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falls well within the Commerce Power ends the constitutional
inquiry.3 37
But should it? Suppose Congress desires that the States shoulder
regulatory responsibility for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, pur-
suant to Federal EPA supervision. Any State that does not accept this
important "cooperative federalism" venture will not have any direct
penalties exacted against it; the Federal Act will merely bar private
persons and entities from applying for permits to build new homes
within the State. Acting under the Commerce Clause, Congress need
not offer much of a rationale for the law; it can find that such con-
struction generates new hazardous wastes and that those "prod-
ucts"' 338 should not be created until hazardous waste sites are cleaned
up. The objective and effect would be to extort an agreement from
the State to accept the Federally defined regulatory responsibility.
Again, by barring certain activities in the State's private sector should
the State government fail to assume a Federal regulatory goal, Con-
gress can ensure that the administrative and financial burdens of the
Federal program are transferred to the States. As expected, the eco-
nomic and political impact of the proscription on certain private activ-
ity would be too great for the State government to withstand.
If the Court retains its mirror-image approach to questions con-
cerning the intersection of the Commerce Clause and federalism val-
ues as reflected in the Tenth Amendment, the only recourse is to find
some implied restrictions in the commerce power-assertedly a diffi-
cult and perhaps mistaken task.339 It may be possible, however, to
fashion a bright-line rule barring Congress from linking private sector
penalties to the contingency of State agreement to assume Federal
337. See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2417-18.
338. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (ruling garbage is a product
that moves in commerce and thus subject to the Commerce Clause and its dormant impli-
cations). Hazardous wastes generated by new construction include remainders of paint
and other finishings, pressure treated lumber (containing, inter alia, arsenic), and chemical
sealants and caulkings.
339. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981),
the Court wrote:
The task of a court that is asked to determine whether a particular exercise of
congressional power is valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow.
The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding. This estab-
lished, the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether "the means
chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the
Constitution."
Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
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regulatory responsibilities.3" Such a rule would promote political ac-
countability at both the Federal and State levels, and would keep Con-
gress from manipulating the system of representative government in
the States, a salutary outcome for federalism and republican govern-
ment,341 but not one now within the Court's precedents. 342
G. Command Plus Extraordinary Inducement/Penalty
Under this model, the Federal government instructs States to im-
plement Federal standards and attempts to induce them to comply by
extraordinary financial incentives. If a State does not comply, the
Federal government neither implements the program within the State
nor exacts financial penalties other than the withdrawal of eligibility
for certain significant Federal grant programs. The Federal strategy
seems to lie in specifying sufficiently high rewards for participation,
and penalties for nonparticipation, that all States find it politically and
economically impossible to refuse. While all of the bills other than
Senator Coats's contain some versions of the basic conditional Federal
grant program, two bills exact such significant monetary penalties for
noncompliance as to deserve separate consideration.
1. Use of Command Plus Extraordinary Inducement/Penalty
The McDermott-Wellstone single-payer plan mandates that all
State governments establish a single-payer regulatory apparatus that
complies with specified Federal standards and also requires States to
340. Such a rule could also embrace the mechanism of imposing a conditional tax on
State residents to pay for a regulatory system their State refused to implement itself. See
supra text accompanying notes 315-34.
341. See id.
342. An appropriate basis could lie in the Guarantee Clause, around which the Court
has repeatedly been dancing since Gregory v. Ashcroft. See Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2402-03;
New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432-33. The Guarantee Clause provides: "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government. . . ." U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 4. The Clause enshrines the constitutional values of republican citizen-
ship and effective representative government, see generally New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2432-
33; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), arguably two of the most foundational values within
the original Constitution. Civic republican literature has developed these points. See, e.g.,
Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97
YALE LJ. 1623 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution
vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modem
Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 74 (1989); Hoke, supra note 13. For a thoughtful develop-
ment of the issues surrounding the justiciability of the Guarantee Clause, see Deborah
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988).
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submit a plan describing the system to HHS for its approval.343 The
bill does not specify a Federal default system for noncomplying States.
Only after HHS approves the State's plan is it eligible to receive funds
from the Federal Health Security Trust Fund to pay for providers' bills
for services submitted to the State.3 " The bill specifies the Federal
contribution as not less than 81% nor more than 91% of the annual
health budget authorized for the State. The balance of the program
would be paid from State funds.345
The Nickles bill contains the other example of this model. In or-
der to remain eligible for "receiving Federal funds for health care pro-
grams, 346 the bill mandates that a State must provide health
insurance coverage equal to the Federally qualified plans to all of the
residents of the State who are not insured privately.347 The bill ac-
cords States four options by which they may execute this obligation,
including the alternative of providing coverage under the State's
Medicaid program.14 It also permits States to charge individuals for
the insurance premium, in light of the cost of the premium and the
individual's ability to pay.349 The model does not supply any default
mechanism in case a State does not establish the program; the State
would simply lose millions in funds from the Public Health Service
Act and other Federal health programs such as Medicaid.3
343. H.R. 1200 § 101(a) reads: "There is hereby established in the United States a
State-based American Health Security Program to be administered by the individual States
in accordance with the Federal standards specified in, or established under, this Act." The
States are commanded to develop the administrative system to effectuate the Federal pro-
gram in § 405(a): "Each State shall submit to the [National Health] Board a plan for a
State health secretary program for providing for health care services to the residents of the
State in accordance with this Act."
344. Id. § 604.
345. Id. § 604(b).
346. S. 1743 § 131(a).
347. Id.
348. Id. § 131(b).
349. Id. § 131(c)(2)(b)(A). Although the bill does not specify the range of Federal
rulemaking authorized to implement the bill, it is reasonable to expect that HHS would
provide some guidelines as to how much money a State would be permitted to charge
persons at differing income levels.
350. Yet if a State agrees to participate in the new Federal program, that agreement
apparently creates a health insurance entitlement for the uninsured running against the
State. If interpreted to create an entitlement, the substantive and procedural liability
thereby created would be enormous. While the bill does authorize the State to attempt to
recoup some of its costs from the uninsured themselves, such a tax would be aimed at those
who can least afford it. The State's alternative would be to increase other taxes and bear
the political costs for so doing.
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2. Constitutional Questions
If we assess these bills under the four-part analysis that normally
governs spending power questions,3 5' the conclusions are not prob-
lematic; both would easily satisfy the inquiry as currently conceived.
The degree of persuasiveness of the sanctions/inducements, while en-
gendering cautionary words from the Court, 5 2 has yet to render an
enactment unconstitutional. This lax scrutiny permits the national
government to formulate and achieve objectives which are not strictly
within its delegated powers. An expansive reading of the spending
power and a deferential standard of review permit the Federal govern-
ment to adapt to changing times. A broad spending power can, more-
over, be justified within the larger theory of popular control of
government through the political process.3 53
Yet State governments continue to express concern via litigation
that some limits should be recognized and enforced to reduce the co-
ercion of Federal conditional grant programs. In Nevada v. Skin-
ner,354 for instance, certain legislation required, as a condition of
receiving money from the Federal Highway Trust Fund, each State to
post road signs specifying a maximum speed limit of 55 m.p.h. Any
State that did not conform would be debarred from "all future Federal
highway grants. 355 Nevada submitted that 95% of its annual highway
budget derived from the trust fund and thus contended that the partic-
ular condition passed the line separating persuasion from coercion.35 6
The Ninth Circuit was unimpressed, however, emphasizing that Ne-
vada was still free to raise revenues from other sources to fund its
351. The recognized spending power inquiry requires that: (1) the expenditure must be
for the general welfare; (2) the conditions imposed upon States receipt of the Federal grant
must be unambiguous; (3) "the conditions imposed are reasonably related to the purpose
of the expenditure"; and (4) the conditions imposed by the Federal act do not violate any
independent constitutional prohibition. See, e.g., New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2426; South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
352. The Court has noted, "Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances
the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 210-11 (quoting Stew-
ard Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); see also New Hampshire Dep't of Em-
ployment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 246 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[T]he carrot has [not]
become a club because rewards for conforming have increased.").
353. See generally, Choper, supra note 13; JoIn HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRusr (1980).
354. 884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989).
355. Id. at 446.
356. Id. By contrast, the statutory penalty in Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, would deprive a
State of merely 5 percent of its highway trust fund allotment.
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highway needs.357 Moreover, the court found it difficult to fashion a
"principled definition" of "coercion."
Does the relevant inquiry turn on how high a percentage of the
total programmatic funds is lost when federal aid is cut-off? Or
does it turn, as Nevada claims in this case, on what percentage
of the federal share is withheld? Or on what percentage of the
state's total income would be required to replace those funds?
Or on the extent to which alternative private, state, or federal
sources of highway funding are available? 58
The court concluded the inquiry sought under a "coercion theory" was
inappropriate for the judiciary.35 9
If, presumptively, some constitutional limits on the outer reaches
of the spending power are appropriate, yet a coercion theory is un-
availing, the alternative basis for such limits remains unclear. One po-
tentially promising alternative, however, lies in Professor Sunstein's
"model of reasons: an approach that asks whether the [Federal] gov-
ernment has constitutionally sufficient justifications for affecting con-
stitutionally protected interests."360 The constitutionally protected yet
putatively injured interests at stake in conditional grant programs con-
cern the ability of State governments to function as separate and in-
dependent representative governments for their citizens. The
strategic use of Federal grant programs threatens the constitutional
role of States; the grants may be employed to reduce or eliminate the
independence of and regulatory experimentation by State govern-
ments. Federal minimum standards, for instance, can be restyled as
"ceilings" or mandatory national standards. Because of the lure of
Federal monies, States may further accede to the movement toward
homogenization of the nation's law and regulatory programs. Profes-
sor Sunstein's approach would not raise insurmountable barriers to
conditional grants but would abandon the Court's highly deferential
approach in favor of somewhat greater scrutiny. The Court seems a
long way, however, from questioning its spending power precedent
357. See Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448 n.5.
358. Id.
359. Id. (drawing on Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
Kathleen Sullivan agrees that the focus on "coercion" is inappropriate, for it "is an inevita-
bly normative inquiry .... Moreover, coercion does not exhaust the modes through which
government can impermissibly pressure preferred liberties." Kathleen Sullivan, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1420 (1989). See also CAss R. SuNnmsmrN,
THE PARTIAL CONsTrrTUION 300 (1993) ("[T]he development of a baseline to distinguish
between penalties and subsidies is neither necessary nor sufficient."); Rosenthal, supra
note 6, at 1122-23.
360. SUNSTEIN, supra note 359, at 292.
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and mode of review, so the two provisions exemplifying this model
will face no serious constitutional challenges in the immediate future.
Conclusion
The novel models of Federal-State relations found in the health
reform bills highlight the increasingly tight financial strictures within
which Congress must act. To engender overdue fiscal responsibility,
Congress has enacted an internal rule requiring that no bill that would
exert a negative impact on the Federal treasury can be introduced
without including a proposal for generating those revenues. 361 This
requirement, and the mushrooming of the Federal deficit, unquestion-
ably have led to more creative and aggressive congressional attempts
to locate new sources of revenue, such as recourse to State govern-
ments to supply funds, personnel, and political prestige for new Fed-
eral regulatory initiatives.
Analysis of these new regulatory and revenue techniques which
seek to use State governments as tools for achieving larger Federal
purposes reveals their detrimental impact on constitutional values re-
flected in the Tenth Amendment. To the extent that the Federal man-
dates are constitutionally permissible, a State's satisfaction of Federal
revenue requirements would reasonably take priority over State-de-
fined purposes, and a State's enforcement of Federal norms would
limit its own scope of independent authority. On both counts the abil-
ity of the States to address local problems and to serve as "laborato-
ries of experiment" would be diminished. Citizen interest in and
solicitude for State and local governments would decline even more
precipitously because the real power over the State fisc, and over the
State's law, would reside in Washington. The threat thus posed with-
out New York's intercession is the transmutation of States into little
more than the bureaucratic field offices of the nation-a representa-
tive government in form not substance. 362 These concerns are of con-
stitutional dimension and fall well within the values the Tenth
Amendment embraces.
New York permits judicial examination under the Tenth Amend-
ment of Federal attempts to utilize or confiscate portions of a State
361. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified as amended, throughout Titles 2, 31 and 42 of the United
States Code).
362. Taking such a path would not only effectively eliminate States as governments but
might also intensify the grip on Congress held by interest groups. See generally Richard B.
Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 335, 34-42 (1992) (criticizing factional
control of Congress and administrative agencies achieved by interest groups).
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government's purse or administrative personnel. Although one ra-
tionale behind Garcia's apparent abdication of the Amendment's jus-
ticiability lay in the inability to fashion judicially manageable
standards, the application of New York to the proposed health plans
suggests the Court may have reached its previously elusive goal. The
foundational principles enunciated in New York seem to permit rea-
soned, consistent application. While undoubtedly they will require
further elaboration in additional cases, the New York opinion provides
principled guidance in dealing with matters falling in the margins.
Perhaps the most salutary result of New York, however, lies in its
structural support for the maintenance of republican process values
and multiple legal and political nomoi.363 Across virtually all legal
fields today, there appears to be an incessant movement toward legal
consolidation, toward unitary law. Model laws and restatements have
facilitated this movement, the benefits of which continue to be her-
alded.3 1 The values behind maintaining a multiplicity of legal norms
originating from different legal cultures seem increasingly remote to
legal scholars, citizens, and legislators alike; reflexive dismissal of mul-
tiple legal nomoi, for imposing undue transaction costs continues un-
abated. Yet we must question whether or not legal progress rests with
legal consolidation, with unitary law. In our own nation, the power to
issue uniform law lies exclusively with the Federal government. To
the degree that we associate legal progress and justice with unitary
law, the more likely we are to embrace unrestricted Federal power.
Ironically, as the move for centralized, unitary law becomes more vig-
orous, the epistemological foundations for the position are sustaining
much greater scrutiny and criticism.36 Few arguments are advanced
urging that the noneconomic, noncommodity values involved in multi-
363. Robert Cover insightfully argued in favored of recognizing and maintaining multi-
ple independent units, or nomoi, by which community values may be recognized and pro-
tected through legal rules. See generally Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
364. See Symposium: One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws, 89 MicH. L. REv.
2073 (1991) (celebrating model State laws). The Uniform Commercial Code is designed in
part to lower transaction costs, especially for interstate trade, and to institute a wiser law
than the prior patchwork of inconsistent State laws. Unitary international trade laws, such
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the North American Free Trade
Agreement, assert the goals of lowering the transactional costs of trade and benefitting
consumers thereby. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, 61 Stat. A5 (1947);
North American Free Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
365. See, e.g., MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExCLu-
SION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); ELIZABETH KAMARCK MmCH, TRANSFORmING
KNOWLEDGE (1990).
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pie legal norms be recognized and maintained-that perhaps a plural-
ity of legal cultures within our nation is a distinctive benefit. 66
New York was issued into a legal and political culture that finds
federalism outmoded and its underlying values, including the protec-
tion of multiple legal nomoi, unpersuasive. Perhaps the legislative
strategies found in the proposed health plans show that the very sur-
vival of State governments as independent sources of law and policy is
seriously threatened if the Tenth Amendment is not justiciable. Per-
haps they will move us to rethink our commitments to the proposition
that the political process alone sufficiently protects federalism and its
underlying values.
366. Notable exceptions include Professors Robert Cover, supra, note 363, Martha Mi-
now, MiNow, supra note 365, and Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L.
REv. 917 (1985).

